Abstract
Scholars of political terrorism generally agree that the radical group is usually a splinter faction of an opposition movement. Seldom, however, is an attempt made to incorporate insights and tools from the literature on social movements and contentious politics into the study of the process by which a faction splinters from the larger opposition movement and adopts terrorist tactics—a process commonly known as radicalization. Drawing upon the relational approach from the literature on contentious politics, this article seeks to further understanding of radicalization by examining how and when relational mechanisms, operating in their respective relational arenas, interact and combine to drive it. Proposed is a relational framework for a comparative analysis of radicalization at three levels—domestic, ethno-national, and international—employing the case of the Weather Underground, Fatah-Tanzim, and al-Qaeda respectively.
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Notes
- 1.
For an outstanding review of the literature, see Berman and Laitin (2007).
- 2.
For a comprehensive review of scholarly critical debate on the “mechanism-process” research program, see: Qualitative Sociology 31(4); and Mobilization 8(3). For an overview of those debates, see Demetriou (2009).
- 3.
While the Weathermen considered themselves, to varying degree, as part of an international movement, al-Qaeda is nonetheless the most significant case of transnational political terrorism. The Tanzim, while surely not the only case of intra-national political terrorism (e.g., the IRA or ETA), was chosen also because it is a case study on which relatively little is known.
- 4.
It is possible to treat a given mechanism as a process and vice versa. Since I aim at emphasizing the recurring features of a set of mechanisms in the process of radicalization and focusing on the movement as the unit of analysis, competition for power, “unfavorable opportunity/threat ratio,” and “action-counteraction escalation” are treated here as mechanisms.
- 5.
A fourth component is the context of contention, the structure of conflict, which, due to length considerations, is incorporated into the analysis of the other three. For a useful analysis of this component in the case of the Weathermen, see Marwick (1998); Jacobs (1970), and Steigerwald (1995); for Al Qaeda, see Byman (2003); Schweitzer and Shay (2003), and Sageman (2004); for the case of Tanzim, see Alimi (2006) and Harel and Isacharoff (2004).
- 6.
Although not the only arenas and mechanisms that drive radicalization, they are seen here as the most basic and recurring arenas/mechanisms from which other possible arenas are influenced and with which other mechanisms concatenate. For example, the existence of a counter-movement (as an additional relational arena) is certainly not as recurring an arena as that between movement activists and security forces.
- 7.
This arena is distinguishable from the arena between the movement and the political system given that a change in the position of the movement vis-à-vis the political system may say little about the precise nature of the interaction between activists and state forces (see: Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Gillham and Noakes 2007).
- 8.
Not to be confused with Bloom’s (2005) “outbidding” thesis. In Bloom, outbidding is a post-radicalization horizontal process between radical groups of a fragmented movement vying for support among the population they claim to represent by outbidding each other through reliance on ever more radical tactics. Interestingly, Bloom’s thesis was criticized for not incorporating outbidding between state forces and movement activists (Araj 2008), and for neglecting the political context (Pape 2003).
- 9.
Given that relational mechanisms produce their effects in conjunction with behavioral and cognitive mechanisms, the following analysis, while privileging relational mechanisms, will make occasional references to how the former mechanisms gain saliency during a weakening of coordination among actors involved in politics of contention.
- 10.
Both groups, however, significantly differed from the “old guard” SDSers in terms of ideology, age, lifestyle, and preferred action strategy. These differences are seen by some as central in the radicalization of the Weathermen (see Gitlin (Gitlin 1980) on the flamboyant style, Sprinzak (1998) on the impact of ideology, and Steigerwald (1995) on the post-adolescent factor). While I do not completely reject the influence of these factors, I argue that these lines of explanation overlook the role of relational mechanisms and, in line with Varon (2004), I see the Weathermen as anything but self-indulgent fools living out Bonnie-and-Clyde fantasies.
- 11.
Here I am referring to the changing of the guards within SNCC that, following a failed attempt to gain more political rights for blacks within the Democratic Party during the 1964 Convention in Atlantic City, began to advocate revolutionary violence and the idea of Black Power more openly with Stokely Carmichael as the new chair in 1966.
- 12.
It is noteworthy that in the context of the Afghan-Soviet war the STJM received military and financial support from the Saudi royal family. The issue of U.S. Military support is debatable. According to Sageman (2004), US military aid was designed to support the Afghan Mujahedeen forces, funneled through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, and if it arrived at the hands of STJM Mujahedeen it was through the former channel.
- 13.
Yet, even after the pull-out of the Red Army forces, fighting against the Soviet presence continued until the fall of the Kabul Communist regime in 1992.
- 14.
It is noteworthy that an additional split occurred roughly around the same time, in 1991, between the Peshawar-based branch of the EIJ and the Egypt-based one. According to Sageman (2004, p. 148), the Peshawar-based expatriates became deeply influenced by al-Zawahiri who decided to sever ties completely with Abud al-Zumur, the imprisoned leader of the Egyptian branch.
- 15.
Indicative of this, and also of the break from the “old guard” SDSers, was the adoption of a non-exclusionist policy according to which authoritarian-like groups and organizations—such as PL—could join SDS, during the 1965 national meeting in Kewadin, Michigan. The adoption of a non-exclusionist policy went against the original political outlook of SDS, which opposed a hard-line orthodox ideology and embraced a pragmatic, experiment-like idealism of participatory democracy.
- 16.
In English referred to as the Wall Mountain, Palestinian lands south of Jerusalem.
- 17.
Although it is true that Arafat and the PA were successful in weakening the Islamic opposition through repressive measures aimed at its leaders, as argued by Usher (2000), the Islamic organizations remained popular and influential throughout the time period under investigation. Part of the reason was related, as mentioned, to the difficulties in making progress in implementing the Oslo Accords, as well as to the growing public unrest and criticism over corruption and nepotism inside the PA.
- 18.
It is important to note in this context the effects of the September 11 events on Israeli policy towards the Intifada. For Sharon and Bush, the Intifada had become another coordinate on the “axis of evil,” and the White House provided Sharon with a “carte blanche” to act according to what he thought would best eradicate terrorism.
- 19.
http://www.palestinianfacts.org (“start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000”). Revealingly, this finding challenges the commonly held conception that the Intifada was spontaneous (see, Usher 2000).
- 20.
In all three cases, transgressive contention was already present given the presence of other factions of the larger movements who were not considered as constituted actors, and/or who employed violent means of contention. Here, I will only focus on the three factions and the influence of action-counteraction escalation on their radicalization.
- 21.
Clashes erupted on October 1st in the Umm al-Fahm area and quickly spread throughout the Triangle, spilling into Israeli cities and involving Arab and Jewish communities in locations such as Tiberias, Jaffa, and Upper Nazareth. The violent clashes lasted for 3 days and came to a halt as a result of an aggressive police response, which entailed the use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. On October 3, 2000, as a result of harsh protest policing, 13 Palestinian citizens of Israel were killed and hundreds of protestors and dozens of police officers were injured.
- 22.
“Land clearing” stands for “Hisuf” in Hebrew, meaning a sweeping demolition of houses, the uprooting of orchards, and the destruction of farmland, and is used mostly in areas surrounding the settlements (B’Tselem 2002).
- 23.
On October 12, 2000 two Israeli reservists who made the wrong turn into the West Bank city of Ramallah were arrested by the PA police. An agitated Palestinian mob stormed the police station, beat the two soldiers to death, and threw their mutilated bodies onto the street.
- 24.
This stands in contrast to those who suggest that plans to target the United States were rooted in the ideology and vision of al-Qaeda members much earlier, and that with the increased confidence as a result of the successful ousting of the Soviets from Afghanistan these plans resurfaced (see for example, Gerges (2005)).
- 25.
At this point, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York had not been proven to be directly related to bin Laden.
- 26.
For example, in July 1999, President Clinton imposed a ban on US trade with the Taliban regime and froze Taliban assets in the United States.
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Acknowledgments
Earlier versions benefited greatly from insightful comments made by Lorenzo Bosi, Robert Brym, Charalambos Demetriou, Ami Pedahzur, James Piazza, Charlotte Ryan, Sidney Tarrow, and the late Charles Tilly. Special thanks go also to Adam Hofman, Liora Norwich, and Alon Burstein, graduate students at the Hebrew University, for assisting me in my research on al-Qaeda.
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Alimi, E.Y. Relational dynamics in factional adoption of terrorist tactics: a comparative perspective. Theor Soc 40, 95–118 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-010-9137-x
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Keywords
- Terrorism
- Contentious politics
- Weathermen, Fatah-Tanzim, Al-Qaeda