Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp 117–136

Strategic self-ignorance

  • Linda Thunström
  • Jonas Nordström
  • Jason F. Shogren
  • Mariah Ehmke
  • Klaas van’t Veld
Article

Abstract

We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58%) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

Keywords

Strategic ignorance Calorie information avoidance Guilt aversion Self-control 

JEL Classification

D03 D81 D83 

Supplementary material

11166_2016_9236_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (396 kb)
ESM 1(PDF 396 kb)

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Linda Thunström
    • 1
    • 2
  • Jonas Nordström
    • 3
    • 4
  • Jason F. Shogren
    • 2
  • Mariah Ehmke
    • 5
  • Klaas van’t Veld
    • 2
  1. 1.HUI Research ABStockholmSweden
  2. 2.Department of Economics and FinanceUniversity of WyomingLaramieUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsLund UniversityLundSweden
  4. 4.Department of Food and Resource EconomicsUniversity of CopenhagenFrederiksberg CDenmark
  5. 5.Department of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsUniversity of WyomingLaramieUSA

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