Abstract
Many theorists have expressed the view that current or future applications of neurotechnology may prompt serious ethical problems in terms of privacy. This article concerns the question as to whether involuntary neurotechnological mind reading can plausibly be held to violate a person’s moral right to mental privacy. It is argued that it is difficult to specify what a violation of a right to mental privacy amounts to in a way that is consistent with the fact that we usually regard natural mind reading as morally unproblematic.
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For a fine overview of different positions in the legal debate, see Shen (2013, pp. 694–97).
For instance, recall Mill’s famous contention that ‘to have a right … is … to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give him no other reason than general utility’ (Mill 1962, p. 309).
For an interesting discussion of the possible effects of mind transparency on our interpersonal transactions and relationships, see Richmond (2012).
For a general discussion of the significance of our privacy interests, see e.g. Moore (2003).
Precisely how such judgements of others’ minds are produced is a complicated question within philosophy of mind, and one that cannot be addressed in the present context. All that matters here is that people usually possess a theory of mind.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be mentioned that the point here is not to suggest that natural mind reading can never be carried out in a way that we would regard as wrong (or inappropriate), but rather that it is difficult to give content to the idea of a right to mental privacy in a way that succeeds in explaining the wrongness of neurotechnological mind reading without turning unproblematic instances of natural mind reading into activities which are wrong.
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Ryberg, J. Neuroscience, Mind Reading and Mental Privacy. Res Publica 23, 197–211 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9343-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9343-0