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Res Publica

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 367–385 | Cite as

Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?

  • Adam HoseinEmail author
Article

Abstract

The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated theory that can explain both why the role of responsibility is limited and why it is sometimes relevant? It is hard to see what theory could unify these disparate elements of our common-sense morality, and if one cannot be found then we may simply have to revise some of our pre-theoretic beliefs. But it would be an important advantage of a theory if it could justify those beliefs. I will argue that there is a theory of this kind: surprisingly, the familiar rights theory of self-defense, defended by Judith Thomson, can do so if it is suitably supplemented. Along the way I will survey some alternative theories of self-defense and show why they are not up to the task.

Keywords

Self-defense Responsibility Beneficence Killing 

Notes

Acknowledgments

For helpful comments, I am very grateful to Tyler Doggett, David Mapel, Jeff McMahan, and two anonymous referees.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of Colorado, BoulderBoulderUSA

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