Abstract
A growing number of theorists have argued that toleration, at least in its traditional sense, is no longer applicable to liberal democratic political arrangements—especially if these political arrangements are conceived of as neutral. Peter Jones has tried make sense of political toleration while staying true to its more traditional (disapproval yet non-prevention) meaning. In this article, while I am sympathetic to his motivation, I argue that Jones’ attempt to make sense of political toleration is not successful.
Notes
My criticism of Jones’ argument is different to that of Glen Newey (2011). Newey’s primary interest is in defending against Jones his claim that toleration is always symmetrical; that is, that toleration involves at least two groups which can legitimately charge each other with intolerance, and thus if a democratic state intervenes, there is no tolerant option, it can only choose which intolerance to favour. This means that Newey’s understanding of toleration, if correct, rules out political toleration of the sort Jones is intending to demonstrate. The symmetry thesis is rejected by Jones (2011).
Preston King (1976, p. 22) when making this distinction, describes the powerless version of tolerance as ‘acquiescence’. I prefer ‘enduring’ as it avoids the sense of indifference and voluntariness that sometimes goes with acquiescence.
An ‘objection’ component is part of King’s definition (1976, pp. 44–54), and also that of Rainer Forst (forthcoming, chap. 1).
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Glen Newey, Susan Mendus, John Horton and a referee for useful comments on an earlier version of this work.
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Balint, P. Not Yet Making Sense of Political Toleration. Res Publica 18, 259–264 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9177-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9177-3