Relational Autonomy and Paternalistic Interventions
Relational conceptions of autonomy attempt to take into account the social aspects of autonomous agency. Those views that incorporate not merely causally, but constitutively necessary relational conditions, incorporate a condition that has the form:
I argue that any account that incorporates such a condition (irrespective of how the relations, S, are spelt out) cannot play one of autonomy’s key normative roles: identifying those agents who ought to be protected from (hard) paternalistic intervention. I argue, against objections from Oshana, that there are good reasons for maintaining the notion of autonomy in this role, and thus that such relational conceptions should not be accepted. This rejection goes beyond that from John Christman, which holds only for those relational conditions which are value-laden.
(RelAgency) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the agent stands in social relations S.
KeywordsAutonomy Relational conditions Paternalism Marina Oshana John Christman
- Antony, Louise. 1995. Is psychological individualism a piece of ideology? Hypatia 10: 157–174.Google Scholar
- Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. Unprincipled virtue: An inquiry into moral worth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Benson, Paul. 2005. Taking ownership: Authority and voice in autonomous agency. In Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: New essays, ed. John Christman and Anderson Joel, 101–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Christman, John. 1991. Autonomy and personal history. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21: 1–24.Google Scholar
- Christman, John, and Joel Anderson (eds.). 2005. Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: New essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Dworkin, Gerald. 1972. Paternalism. The Monist 56: 64–84.Google Scholar
- Dworkin, Gerald. 1983. Paternalism: Some second thoughts, sartorius. In Paternalism, ed. Rolf. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
- Griffin, James. 1986. Well-being: Its meaning, measurement and moral importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
- Mackenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar (eds.). 2000a. Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Mackenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar. 2000b. Autonomy refigured. In Relational Autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Office of Public Sector Information, Mental Capacity Act. 2005. chapter 9. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050009_en_1. Accessed 08/06/09.
- Meyers, Diana T. 1987. Personal autonomy and the paradox of feminine socialisation. Journal of Philosophy 84: 619–629.Google Scholar
- Meyers, Diana T. 2000. Intersectional identity and the authentic self? Opposites attract! In Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the self, ed. Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Mill, John Stuart. 1962. Utilitarianism in Warnock. In Utilitarianism and other essays, ed. Mary. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
- Narayan, Uma. 1997. Dislocating cultures: Identities, traditions and third world feminism. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
- Oshana, Marina. 2006. Personal autonomy in society. Alsershot: Ashgate Press.Google Scholar
- Saul, Jennifer. 2003. Feminism: Issues and arguments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Westlund, Andrea. 2009. Rethinking relational autonomy. Hypatia 24(4)Google Scholar
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009