Abstract
One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based pro tanto reasons for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech.
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Earlier drafts of this paper were presented in the 2005 Warwick Graduate Conference in Political theory, the 2005 ALSP Conference at the University of Strathclyde, and the Discussion Group of Political Theory at Warwick University. I am grateful for the many comments received on those occasions, especially to Peter Jones, Graham Long, Glen Newey, Fabienne Peter, Jonathan Seglow and Will Smith. Two anonymous referees for Res Publica gave me helpful comments that benefited the argument defended here. Especial thanks are due to Matthew Clayton and Susan Hurley who provided me with detailed written comments and fruitful discussion.
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Moles, A. Autonomy, free speech and automatic behaviour. Res Publica 13, 53–75 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9015-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9015-6