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When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy

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Abstract

This paper takes a unique approach to study the relationship between bank capital and Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) during the Financial Crisis. A structural credit risk model is used to compute implied market value capital ratios which, when compared to traditional risk-based capital, illustrates the capital deficiency of large BHCs. As these BHCs’ implied capital deteriorated, their default probabilities spiked. The model is then used to solve for the amount of capital needed to reduce default probabilities. This amount is compared to the TARP capital infusions to quantify the TBTF subsidy which is associated with size and reliance on short-term volatile funding.

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Fig. 1

Source Author’s unpublished dissertation

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Notes

  1. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100a.html.

  2. Since the risk-based capital ratios essentially use book values with re-weightings, this is analogous to when a stock price book-to-market ratio goes above 1 for a distressed firm (see Fama and French 1995; Griffin and Lemmon 2002).

  3. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014), respectively.

  4. See, e.g., Bernanke (2009), Tarullo (2009) and Hanson et al. (2011). In fact, this is also addressed in Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act (US House of Representatives 2010).

  5. For more detailed information on TARP and its constituent programs such as the CPP and TIP please see Wilson and Wu (2012), Egly and Mollick (2013), and Calomiris and Khan (2015).

  6. See Merton (1977), Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986, 1989), Pennacchi (1987a, b), Allen and Saunders (1993), and Cooperstein et al. (1995).

  7. More precisely, they use a variation of the Ronn and Verma (1986) model where the strike price is a fraction of the outstanding liabilities’ book value.

  8. I thank the referee for pointing out this connection.

  9. If the model was indeed applied in an ex-ante capacity—for instance examining “what if” scenarios - it could easily be used for stress testing. For example, if regulators wanted to examine how much capital a bank would need if default probabilities were to drop to 5% or if asset values were to fall by 25%, the model could provide considerable insight despite that not being the focus of the present paper. Note that this would be slightly different from the macroprudential philosophy currently in favor, which examines the bank capital implications of factors such as interest rates, productivity growth, or unemployment rates. See Grundke and Pliszka (2018) for a proposed framework similar to the methodology in the present paper but from a macroeconomic perspective.

  10. Interestingly, but only tangentially related to this paper, Wilson (2013) provides evidence of some negative outcomes of TARP for small banks. In that paper, the author documents the existence of “deadbeat banks” which are banks who received TARP support through the CPP but failed to pay dividends on those preferred shares.

  11. E.g. Delianedis and Geske (2003), Leland (2004), Bharath and Shumway (2008).

  12. He and Xiong (2012) present a very nice extension to the Leland and Toft (1996) model which accounts for rollover risk, or the risk that liquidity dries up in debt markets and the firm will not be able to roll-over their maturing debt as is assumed in the Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) framework. Interestingly, in the earlier unpublished working paper version, He and Xiong did extend the Leland and Toft (1996) model to include two classes of debt.

  13. A referee pointed out that, since the TARP infusions were in the form of preferred stock, a structural credit risk model that differentiates preferred from common equity would be more ideal. The standard Geske compound option model discussed in this section portrays both preferred and common equity as the residual claimant. A detailed search of the structural credit risk literature was able to identify one paper, Finnerty (2008), that has nested equity claims similar to what the referee suggested. To incorporate such features into the current analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper and therefore is left to future research.

  14. Adrian and Shin (2010) show that financial institutions tend to actively manage their leverage ratios in a procyclical manner.

  15. The author thanks Mark Flannery for pointing out the fact that the potential for future capital infusions is, in itself, a compound option that is being evaluated by the market.

  16. An interesting paper by Stanhouse and Stock (2016) also uses analytical techniques and stochastic mathematics to study bank capital. However, in their model, both the timing and the level of bank capital are endogenously solved within the context of a Brownian Motion process.

  17. The risk-neutral measure is used for at least two reasons: first, it does not require the estimation of the risk premium for individual banks. Since at any given time the current risk premium is unobservable, attempting to estimate the risk premium introduces yet another degree of uncertainty and potential for model error. Rather, it is more straightforward to use the risk-free rate which is observable. Second, it can be shown that under certain conditions the risk-neutral measure serves as an upper bound on true default probabilities.

  18. See pp. 551–552 in Geske (1977) for how debt subordination is treated in the compound option structural model although the recovery conditions were clarified and corrected in Geske and Johnson (1984)

  19. The true market value of any bank’s assets is unobservable due to the opacity discussed in Flannery et al. (2004) and Flannery et al. (2013) where the latter article studies opaqueness during the financial crisis. The market values of the bank’s debt securities are either unobservable or hard to observe due to illiquidity. Therefore, equity is used to extract information about the unobservable values.

  20. This is the same as the default condition in the Leland–Toft model; see Leland and Toft 1996, p. 994.

  21. The derivations are available from the author upon request.

  22. At this point, the model would collapse to the standard BSM structural model as described earlier in the Section.

  23. For a derivation please see Geske 1977, 1979; Geske and Johnson 1984.

  24. The model is used to solve for a market-implied asset value which could be used in the denominator of the MVC ratio, but the variations over time are almost identical so the simpler MVC ratio is used in the empirical analysis in this paper. It also reduces the potential impact for model error.

  25. E.g. 60 day at-the-money puts, 30 day at-the-money calls, etc.

  26. In symbols: \(\sigma _{E}=\frac{sd}{\sqrt{{1}\diagup {252}}}=sd\sqrt{252}\), where sd is the standard deviation of \(\ln \frac{{{P}_{t}}}{{{P}_{t-1}}}\) for each day over the previous three months. Three months is used to smooth out the noise that results from using a shorter window, such as one month.

  27. Empirical evidence of this can be found in Fan et al. (2016) where the authors study the difference between the ex-post realized volatility and option implied volatility, referred to as the volatility risk premium, and it can clearly be seen that the gap is most pronounced through the crisis period.

  28. Robustness checks were performed on the values for both \(T_{1}\) and \(T_{2}\), separately and together. It turns out that the results are insensitive to the value chosen for \(T_{2}\). However, the results are rather sensitive to the value chosen for \(T_{1}\), although the rank ordering of the capital needs remains the same. For instance, reducing the value of \(T_{1}\) to 0.5 (implying an average maturity of all short-term senior debt to be 6 months) causes default probabilities and the capital needs to fall to insignificant levels; but increasing \(T_{1}\) to 2 sometimes more than doubles the amount of capital needed to reduce default probabilities. To remain consistent with the most common KMV-type implementations in the literature as well as the traditional definition for “short-term liabilities” being those maturing within one year, results are reported and interpreted for \(T_{1}=1\).

  29. This results in risk-neutral default probabilities. In order to compute the “true” probabilities under the physical measure, one would have to be able to accurately estimate the risk premium for each bank holding company over the course of the entire sample period. The cost of attempting to incorporate this into the model arguably outweighs the benefits, since it can be shown (mathematically) when the risk premium is non-negative, the risk-neutral default probability will serve as an upper bound on the physical default probability. This will result in more conservative estimates of default probabilities and capital needs.

  30. In the interest of brevity, the other model inputs—\(F_{1}\), \(F_{2}\), \(T_{1}\), \(T_{2}\), and r—have been dropped from the expression.

  31. See Crouhy et al. (2008) and Gorton (2009) for excellent accounts of the causes and extreme ramifications of the subprime crisis.

  32. Technically, since it is a compound call option, it is a convex function of a convex function, thereby magnifying the effects of convexity that is known to be captured by more standard contingent claims models.

  33. The leverage effect was first put forth by Black (1976) and Christie (1982).

  34. https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-Tracker.aspx

  35. See, for example, Kashyap et al. 2008; Squam Lake Working Group 2009b, a; Bernanke 2009; Tarullo 2009; Hanson et al. 2011; Tarullo 2012.

  36. For a derivation please see Geske 1977, 1979; Geske and Johnson 1984.

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Acknowledgements

Parts of this paper are derived from Chapter 2 of my doctoral dissertation at Rutgers University. I wish to thank my dissertation committee, especially Ren-Raw Chen (Co-Chair) and Ben Sopranzetti (Co-Chair). In fact, this publication is dedicated to Larry Shepp, not only a committee member but also a close mentor, who suggested I use the model from my dissertation to “quantify Too Big To Fail”. I would also like to thank seminar participants at James Madison University, Lehigh University, Oklahoma State University, Rutgers Business School, Villanova University, and State Street Corporation for very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this research. I am especially grateful for input from Anne Anderson, N.K. Chidambaran, Mark Flannery, C.F. Lee (the Editor), Joe Mason, Mike Pagano, Darius Palia, Dale W.R. Rosenthal (FMA 2012 discussant), Ke (Kelly) Wang, Wei Xiong, and two anonymous reviewers. Lastly, I would like to thank my mother-in-law and father-in-law, Xi-Yun Li and Faxiang Hou, for their unwavering support of my career.

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Appendix: Valuation of corporate securities in the compound option model

Appendix: Valuation of corporate securities in the compound option model

To value the securities within the compound option framework it is helpful to visualize the default process as a binomial tree. In Fig. 1 the solid nodes represent survival states, whereas the dashed nodes represent default states. The accompanying table shows the value of the corporate securities (equity, junior debt, and senior debt) at each node. Solving the expectations at node A results in the closed-form valuation equations below.

The value of the securities can be determined at node A (time \(t=0\)) by taking the discounted expected value of the future cash flows at each of the subsequent nodes. For equity and junior debt this results in nested expectations. Consequently, the assumption that Geometric Brownian Motion is the underlying stochastic process ensures that the solution is a function of the bivariate normal distribution, which is very manageable.

Now, for any time t, \(0\le t<{{T}_{1}}\), evaluating the expectations at t gives the closed-form expressions for valuing all of the bank’s claims. Equity is a compound call on the bank’s assets in that shareholders have a claim to

$$\begin{aligned} \mathop {{\mathbb {E}}}\left[ {{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{1}}}}\,\max \left\{ {{E}_{{{T}_{1}}}}-{{F}_{1}},0 \right\} \left| {{V}_{t}} \right. \right] , \end{aligned}$$
(A.1)

where \({{E}_{{{T}_{1}}}}\) is equal to the value of a European call option at time \({T}_{1}\), which is not known at time t. Let \({{\tau }_{1}}=\left( {{T}_{1}}-t \right)\) be the time between t and the short-term senior debt maturity \(T_{1}\) and\({{\tau }_{2}}=\left( {{T}_{2}}-t \right)\) be the time between t and the long-term junior debt maturity \(T_{2}\). The expectation given in Eq. (A.1) is equal to:Footnote 36

$$\begin{aligned} {{E}_{t}}={{V}_{t}}\,{{N}_{2}}\left( h_{1}^{+},h_{2}^{+};\,\rho \right) -{{F}_{2}}{{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{2}}}}\,{{N}_{2}}\left( h_{1}^{-},h_{2}^{-};\,\rho \right) -{{F}_{1}}{{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{1}}}}N\left( h_{1}^{-} \right) \end{aligned}$$
(A.2)

where \(h_{1}^{+}=\frac{\ln \left( \frac{{{V}_{t}}}{{{\bar{V}}}} \right) +\left( r+\frac{{{\sigma }^{2}}}{2} \right) {{\tau }_{1}}}{\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{1}}}}\),

\(h_{1}^{-}=\frac{\ln \left( \frac{{{V}_{t}}}{{{\bar{V}}}} \right) +\left( r-\frac{{{\sigma }^{2}}}{2} \right) {{\tau }_{1}}}{\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{1}}}}=h_{1}^{+}-\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{1}}}\),

\(h_{2}^{+}=\frac{\ln \left( \frac{{{V}_{t}}}{{{F}_{2}}} \right) +\left( r+\frac{{{\sigma }^{2}}}{2} \right) {{\tau }_{2}}}{\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{2}}}}\),

\(h_{2}^{-}=\frac{\ln \left( \frac{{{V}_{t}}}{{{F}_{2}}} \right) +\left( r-\frac{{{\sigma }^{2}}}{2} \right) {{\tau }_{2}}}{\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{2}}}}=h_{2}^{+}-\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{2}}}\), \(N\left( \centerdot \right)\) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution,

\({{N}_{2}}\left( \centerdot \right)\) denotes the cumulative bivariate standard normal distribution, and correlation \(\rho =\sqrt{{}^{{{\tau }_{1}}}\!\!\diagup \!\!{}_{{{\tau }_{2}}}\;}\)which follows from the properties of Brownian Motion.

\({\bar{V}}\) is the endogenous default boundary, derived in Sect. 3.4.

The senior debt is to be paid at time \(T_{1}\). If the market value of the assets at that time is greater than \({\bar{V}}\), then senior debt holders will be paid the amount \(F_{1}\) in full. However, if the market value of the assets is less than or equal to \({\bar{V}}\) and less than the face value of the senior debt, then there is [total] default at time \(T_{1}\). In this case, the assets will be liquidated and senior debt holders will only recover a portion of what they are owed; specifically they will recover the market value of the assets at the time of default, \(T_{1}\). Thus, the value of the short-term senior debt at time t is given by the expectation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathop {{\mathbb {E}}}\left[ {{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{1}}}}\,\,\min \left\{ {{V}_{{{T}_{1}}}},{{F}_{1}} \right\} \left| {{V}_{t}} \right. \right] . \end{aligned}$$
(A.3)

It is relatively straightforward to show that the expectation given in Eq. (A.3) is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} {{S}_{t}}={{V}_{t}}\left[ 1-N\left( {{k}^{+}} \right) \right] +{{F}_{1}}\,{{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{1}}}}N\left( {{k}^{-}} \right) , \end{aligned}$$
(A.4)

where \({{k}^{+}}=\frac{\ln \left( \frac{{{V}_{t}}}{{{F}_{1}}} \right) +\left( r+\frac{{{\sigma }^{2}}}{2} \right) {{\tau }_{1}}}{\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{1}}}}\) and \({{k}^{-}}=\frac{\ln \left( \frac{{{V}_{t}}}{{{F}_{1}}} \right) +\left( r-\frac{{{\sigma }^{2}}}{2} \right) {{\tau }_{1}}}{\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{1}}}}={{k}^{+}}-\sigma \sqrt{{{\tau }_{1}}}\).

Then, finally, there is the bank’s junior debt which has the interesting property that when asset values are well above the default boundary they are a fixed claim and their prices behave like debt, but in times of distress they are a residual claim and their prices behave like equity. The model captures this characteristic of bank subordinated debentures well. The value of the long-term junior debt at time t is given by the expectation:

$$\begin{aligned} {\mathbb {E}}\left[ {{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{1}}}}\left( \left( {J}_{{T}_{1}}\,\cdot {\mathbb {I}}_{\left\{ {V}_{{T}_{1}}>{\bar{V}} \right\} } \right) +\left( \max \left\{ {V}_{{T}_{1}}-{{F}_{1}},0 \right\} \cdot {\mathbb {I}}_{\left\{ {V}_{{T}_{1}}\le {\bar{V}} \right\} } \right) \right) \left| {V}_{t} \right. \right] \end{aligned}$$
(A.5)

where \({\mathbb {I}}_{\left\{ V>{\bar{V}} \right\} }\) is the indicator function that equals 1 if \(V>{\bar{V}}\) and 0 otherwise.

To obtain the closed-form solution for the long-term junior debt the expectation given in Eq. (A.5) can be evaluated directly or, since the expectation for short-term senior debt is considerably more straightforward, the fact that \({{V}_{t}}={{E}_{t}}+{{J}_{t}}+{{S}_{t}}\) can be used to solve for \({{J}_{t}}={{V}_{t}}-{{E}_{t}}-{{S}_{t}}\). Subtracting Eqs. (A.2) and (A.4) from \(V_{t}\) gives:

$$\begin{aligned} {{J}_{t}}={{V}_{t}}\left[ N\left( {{k}^{+}}\right) -{{N}_{2}}\left( h_{1}^{+},\,h_{2}^{+};\,\rho \right) \right] +{{F}_{1}}{{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{1}}}}\left[ N\left( h_{1}^{-}\right) N\left( {{k}^{-}}\right) \right] +{{F}_{2}}{{e}^{-r{{\tau }_{2}}}}{{N}_{2}}\left( h_{1}^{-},h_{2}^{-};\,\rho \right) \end{aligned}$$
(A.6)

where all of the terms are as previously defined in Eqs. (A.2) and (A.4).

Although asset volatility is assumed to be constant, equity volatility is not constant but rather changes as a function of asset value and other parameters in the model. This was first shown by geske-1979. Equity, being a compound option on the underlying asset, has its own stochastic dynamics which can be specified using Ito’s Lemma. From the Ito expansion, the volatility term for equity is

$$\begin{aligned} {{\sigma }_{E}}=\frac{\partial E}{\partial V}\,\frac{V}{E}{{\sigma }_{V}}. \end{aligned}$$
(A.7)

The partial derivative \(\frac{\partial E}{\partial V}\) can be found by differentiating Eq. (A.2) with respect to asset value and is known as the “equity delta”:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial E}{\partial V}={{N}_{2}}\left( h_{1}^{+},h_{2}^{+};\,\rho \right) . \end{aligned}$$
(A.8)

Plugging Eq. (A.8) into Eq. (A.7) gives

$$\begin{aligned} {{\sigma }_{E}}={{N}_{2}}\left( h_{1}^{+},h_{2}^{+};\,\rho \right) \,\frac{V}{E}{{\sigma }_{V}}. \end{aligned}$$
(A.9)

This equation says that, holding everything else constant, as more leverage is introduced the equity volatility becomes greater than the asset volatility. This leverage effect is consistent with standard corporate finance theory which says that leverage increases the riskiness of a firm’s equity as financial risk is compounded on top of the inherent total business risk (as proxied by \({{\sigma }_{V}}\)).

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Imerman, M.B. When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy. Rev Quant Finan Acc 55, 1371–1406 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-020-00877-x

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