Abstract
Tyler Andrew Wunder, in his article, “Alvin Plantinga on Paul Draper’s evolutionary atheology: implications of theism’s non-contingency (Wunder in International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 74: 67–75 2013),” argues that Plantinga makes a serious error regarding probabilities in his critique of Draper. Properly modified, Wunder believes the argument “works,” but only in a trivial sense. This paper argues that Wunder’s objection, based on an assumed probability calculus, is merely asserted; whereas, there are other competing axiomatic systems consistent with Plantinga’s treatment of probability. As to the modified argument, it is demonstrated that Wunder mistakenly concludes that two key propositions are contradictory. The consequence of this is not that Plantinga’s argument “works” in a trivial sense, but rather that the argument becomes incoherent. Lastly, this paper will explore the consequences of both Wunder’s and Plantinga’s assumptions concerning conditional probability for Draper’s evidentiary argument and Plantiga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.
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Notes
On the other hand, if evolution were not true, then even if (1) were true, evolution could not be used as evidence favoring naturalism over theism.
Under the supposition that theism is contingent, Plantinga argues that all else is not evidentially equal. He argues that there are many other probabilities favoring theism over naturalism such that the evidence favoring naturalism over theism is more than counterbalanced by the evidence favoring theism over naturalism (Plantinga 2011, p. 51).
If theism is necessarily true, then naturalism cannot be more likely than theism. However, this does not refute (DA) per se (see sub-section Ramifications for (DA) given (PA)).
In a subsequent paper titled, “The modality of theism and probabilistic natural theology: a tension in Alvin Plantinga’s philosophy,” Wunder confirms this stating, “The probability of any proposition on a necessary falsehood is undefined; conditional probabilities require that their backgrounds not be necessarily false” (Wunder 2015, p. 392).
In addition to this, Wunder (2015, p. 392) states, “…correcting Plantinga’s probability error reveals that Draper’s premise (1) contradicts theism’s non-contingency (2) outright.” (emphasis and numbers added)
Popper (2002, pp. 356-389)—See footnote 1 beginning on the bottom of page 360 and continued on page 361 where the derivation of theorem 33′ is listed.
The principle here is that division by zero is not defined.
For example, see Alan Hájek’s, “What Conditional Probability Could Not Be,” and the response by Kenny Easwaran in his paper, “What Conditional Probability Must (Almost) Be”.
The referenced text is Brian Skyrms’ (2000) Choice & Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic (4th ed.). Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.
See Hájek, Alan, "Interpretations of Probability", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/probability-interpret/.
After a preliminary review of this paper, Dr. Wunder acknowledged this saying, “I cannot dispute this: it seems an eminently fair and warranted …complaint. This is potentially a shortcoming in my paper, particularly if Plantinga decides to avail himself of one of these competing systems to sustain his claims (private email dated 10/2/2016)”.
Wunder does suggest that what follows from either P(E|N) or P(E|T) having no value is either the falsehood or meaninglessness of (1). This is elaborated in Wunder 2013, n.10 on p.70; however, he goes on to ignore the latter option and continues to work under the assumption that (1) is false when either of the probabilities it compares has no value.
Given (WP), if theism is non-contingent and true, then P(R|N ∧ E) is meaningless and (EAAN) does not get off of the ground.
References
Easwaran, K. (2005). What conditional probability must (almost) be (unpublished). Formal Epistemology Workshop: Delivered at University of Texas–Austin.
Hájek, A. (2003). What conditional probability could not be. Synthese, 137, 273–323.
Plantinga, A. (2011). Where the conflict really lies: Science, religion, naturalism (pp. 49–51). New York: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery (pp. 356–389). New York: Harper & Row.
Wunder, T. (2013). Alvin Plantinga on Paul Draper’s evolutionary atheology: implications of theism’s noncontingency. International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 74, 67–75.
Wunder, T. (2015). The modality of theism and probabilistic natural theology: A tension in Alvin Plantinga’s philosophy. Religious Studies, Cambridge University Press (51: pp. 391–399).
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Bosse, R.B. Wunder’s probability objection. Int J Philos Relig 84, 131–142 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9634-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9634-1