On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

  • Andrew Ter Ern Loke


In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.


Doing Allowing Problem of evil Agent causation Middle knowledge Divine providence Free will 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Hong KongPokfulamHong Kong

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