Divine thoughts and Fregean propositional realism

Article

Abstract

Anderson and Welty have recently advanced an argument for the claim that the laws of logic are ontologically dependent upon a necessarily existent mind, i.e. God. In this paper I argue that a key premise of Anderson and Welty’s argument—viz., a premise which asserts that \(x\) is intrinsically intentional only if \(x\) is mind-dependent—is false, for on a broadly Fregean account of propositions, propositions are intrinsically intentional but not mind-dependent.

Keywords

Frege Propositions God Representation 

References

  1. Alston, W. (1996). A realist conception of truth. NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Anderson, J., & Welty, G. (2011). The lord of noncontradiction. Philosophia Christi, 13(2), 321–338.Google Scholar
  3. Balaguer, M. (2009). Platonism in Metaphysics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/ Accessed 5 Feb 2014.
  4. Balaguer, D. (1998). Attitudes without propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58(4), 805–826.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bozz, A. (2012). Are propositions divine thoughts? http://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/art-Bozzo%20 (Are%20Propositions%20Divine%20Thoughts-ToEPS.pdf. Accessed February 5 2014.Google Scholar
  6. Bradley, R., & Swartz, N. (1979). Possible worlds. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.Google Scholar
  7. Davis, R. B. (2011). God and the Platonic Horde. Philosophia Christi, 13(2), 289–303.Google Scholar
  8. Hale, B. (2009). Realism and antirealism about abstract entities. In J. Kim, E. Sosa, & G. Rosenkrantz (Eds.), A companion to metaphysics (pp. 65–73). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
  9. Jubien, M. (1997). Contemporary metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  10. Jubien, M. (2001). Propositions and the objects of thought. Synthese, 104, 47–62.Google Scholar
  11. Klement, K. (2005). Frege, Gottlob. Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/frege/ Accessed 5 Feb 2014.
  12. Kirkham, R. (1995). Theories of truth. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  13. King, J. (2009). Questions of unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 109, 257–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Leftow, B. (2012). God and necessity. Oxford: Oxford University.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. McGrath, M. (2012). Propositions. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/#nature Accessed 5 Feb 2014.
  16. Plantinga, A. (2007). Alvin plantinga. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Pruss, A. (2012). The Leibnizian cosmological argument. In W. L. Craig & J. P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (pp. 24–100). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
  18. Smith, Q. (1994). The conceptualist argument for god’s existence. Faith and Philosophy, 11(1), 38–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Soames, S. (2014). Why the traditional conceptions of propositions can’t be correct. In J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. speaks (Eds.), New thinking about propositions (pp. 25–45). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Speaks, J. (2014). Representation and structure in the theory of propositions. In J. C. King, S. Soames, & J. Speaks (Eds.), New thinking about propositions (pp. 215–225). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Swoyer, C. (2008). Abstract entities. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne, & D. Zimmerman (Eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics (pp. 11–31). Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  22. Taylor, K. (1998). Truth and meaning. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kwantlen Polytechnic UniversitySurreyCanada

Personalised recommendations