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Fine-tuning as evidence for a multiverse: why White is wrong

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Abstract

Roger White (God and design, Routledge, London, 2003) claims that while the fine-tuning of our universe, \(\alpha \), may count as evidence for a designer, it cannot count as evidence for a multiverse. First, I will argue that his considerations are only correct, if at all, for a limited set of multiverses that have particular features. As a result, I will argue that his claim cannot be generalised as a statement about all multiverses. This failure to generalise, I will argue, is also a feature of design hypotheses. That is, design hypotheses can likewise be made insensitive or sensitive to the evidence of fine-tuning as we please. Second, I will argue that White is mistaken about the role that this evidence plays in fine-tuning discussions. That is, even if the evidence of fine-tuning appears to support one particular hypothesis more strongly than another, this does not always help us in deciding which hypothesis to prefer.

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Notes

  1. Examples no doubt abound, but consider: the Monty Hall problem, the Tuesday Boy problem, or what XKCD author Randall Munroe calls ‘The Hardest Logic Puzzle in the World’, http://xkcd.com/blue_eyes.html.

  2. I think this is not the correct way to understand \(\Pr (F)\), but that is a discussion for another time.

  3. Since \(\Pr (F)\) must be the same across all \(M_x\), and clearly (using 3) \(\Pr (F \mid M_R) \gg \Pr (F \mid M_W)\).

  4. I lack the expertise to properly determine whether Carroll correctly portrays this theory. However, I am not concerned so much with whether it is correct as I am with the consequences of these views if they turn out to be correct.

  5. White in fact states, “for simplicity, let us suppose that we can partition the space of possible outcomes of a Big Bang into a finite set of equally probable configurations”. Since this is taken as a simplifying assumption, I think it is fair to think that White had in mind something that could be generalised to represent the full spectrum of logically possible values. Once we do extend the range to all logically possible values, it seems that the number of configurations would be infinite. \(M_W\) therefore does not match this string theory multiverse, if the string theory multiverse is understood to predict a finite range of possible values that is less than the logically possible range. At the very least, \(\Sigma _W \gg \Sigma _S\).

  6. See Oppy (2006, pp. 219–221) and Manson and Thrush (2003, pp. 76–77), for example.

  7. This multiverse could be a subset of either an independent or limited multiverse. Attaching it to either may allow the observation of \(F\) to count as evidence if it did not otherwise.

  8. Or, more precisely, has a probability of \(0.1\) of behaving in manner \(m_1\) iff no previously fired particle in the same cluster is behaving in manner \(m_1\). See footnote 9 for more information.

  9. Suppose that each particle as it is released from the emitter has the probability \(p = 0.1\) of behaving in manner \(m_1\), and if it does then no subsequently fired particles will behave in manner \(m_1\).

  10. If theory \(B\) predicts about 50 or so particles emitted each time, then the probability is \(\approx 0.995\). If the possibility of failure in \(B\) and not \(A\) is worrying to the reader, then modify theory \(A\)’s prediction for \(\Pr (E^{\prime } \mid A)\) to match \(\Pr (E^{\prime } \mid B)\). As it stands, most times running the experiment only once will give little reason to favour one theory over the other.

  11. Since on theory \(B\), it is possible though unlikely that no particle is observed.

  12. Even though the \(Q\)-experiment example strongly resembles the fine-tuning example that follows, my point was not to suggest they are the same. What I wanted to highlight was simply that showing \(\Pr (E \mid A) \gg \Pr (E \mid B)\) does not necessarily give us a strong reason to favour \(A\) over \(B\), even if our prior probabilities for \(A\) and \(B\) are roughly the same. Indeed, White would point out that the examples are different in at least one important respect: The observer in the \(Q\)-experiment remains the same no matter which particle is observed (if any), but in at least some multiverse hypotheses (such as \(M_W\)) this is not the case.

  13. At least, built into some \(M_x\)’s. Some will not involve any random events at all.

  14. The “This Universe” objection.

  15. In this paper, multiverses are examined in terms of their power to explain the fine-tuning of the universe. This leaves completely unanswered the question of whether, for example, the multiverse itself would need to be fine-tuned. It also leaves unanswered the question of whether a multiverse is a satisfying explanation overall when compared to other fuller competing hypotheses. While any complete and satisfactory multiverse account of fine-tuning would need to address such questions, this paper is not concerned with that project. We are focused on whether or not, given a multiverse, we can account satisfactorily with the fine-tuning of this universe, at least in the context of White’s arguments. There may yet be other reasons to reject a multiverse as an account of fine-tuning.

References

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  1. School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton Campus, Wellington Road, Clayton, VIC, 3800, Australia

    Mark Douglas Saward

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Saward, M.D. Fine-tuning as evidence for a multiverse: why White is wrong. Int J Philos Relig 73, 243–253 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9395-4

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