Abstract
Philosophers of religion have taken the assumption for granted that the various religious traditions of the world have incompatible beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is more problematic than has been generally recognized. To make this argument, I will discuss the implications of internal religious disagreement, an aspect of this issue that has been too often ignored in the contemporary debate. I will also briefly examine some implications of my argument for how one might respond to the existence of religious diversity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
The main exceptions are Basinger (2002) and Christian (1972). However, Basinger doesn’t explore the semantic implications of internal religious disagreement as much as he does the epistemological implications. In this paper, I intend to explore the semantic implications as well. And although Christian does deal with the semantic issue, he raises the question of internal religious disagreement only to dismiss it rather hastily (see p.7ff).
The Encyclopedia of Mormonism article entitled “God” states that “The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are three separate and distinct beings who constitute one Godhead” (1992, p.546–547). I infer that this means that the members of the Godhead are ontologically distinct.
See Paulsen and Potter (1999, p. 250f), for example.
See Phillips (1970), for example.
Thanks to Nathan Kalana-Westbrook for bringing this point to my attention.
There are other problems with the logical approach to defining disagreement. For a more detailed argument see Priest (2006, Chap. 6).
See, e.g., Plantinga (2000, p. 176).
This notion was introduced by Gutting (1982).
It is important to note here that I leave open the possibility that members of an intentional doxastic group could fail to believe the propositions affirmed by their doxastic leader.
This raises the question as to how this notion relates to the concept of an ”anonymous Christian” as Rahner (1982) has advocated. On my view, an anonymous Christian would not be a member of the intentional doxastic group called “Christians” but would only be associated with that group coincidentally.
In this paper, I am only concerned with belief and not practice. But, of course, being a Christian in the full sense involves engaging in certain practices as well.
This terminology is due to Naess (1953, pp. 123ff).
Since my purpose is to question the definitive nature of external religious disagreement on the basis of internal religious disagreement, this assumption does not hurt my case. Indeed, if a religious doxastic group cannot even agree on their basic doxastic utterances, their belief is even more indeterminate than I will argue.
The term ‘exportable’ as applied to knowledge conditions is van Inwagen’s (2010, p.24).
This term is also van Inwagen’s, (2010, p. 28). It is quite appropriate to use the term ‘gnostic’ in this context given that the gnostic religious position was that some people would have special and private knowledge that could not be conveyed directly to others.
Cf. Plantinga (2000).
For a description and defense of the principle of charity, see Davidson (1984, pp. 196–197).
Interpretative liberalism is the attitude of being open to different interpretations of the doxastic utterances of one’s own tradition.
Cf. Plantinga (2000, p.182).
Basinger makes a similar, but not identical, point (2002, pp. 15–16).
I thank an anonymous referee for demonstrating the force of this objection.
Phillips (1970).
A small minority is to a vast majority as a minority is to a majority.
For example, Christianity began as a small-minority interpretation of Judaism and Mormonism remains a small-minority interpretation of Christianity.
References
Basinger, D. (2000). Hick’s religious pluralism and ’reformed epistemology’: A middle ground. In P. Quinn & K. Meeker (Eds.), The philosophical challenge of religious diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Basinger, D. (2002). Religious diversity: A philosophical assessment. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.
Blomberg, C., & Robinson, S. (1997). How wide the divide? A Mormon and an evangelical in conversation. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.
Christian, W. (1972). Oppositions of religious doctrines: A study in the logic of dialogue among religions. New York: Herder and Herder.
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R., & Warfield, T. (2010). Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gutting, G. (1982). Religious belief and religious skepticism. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Ludlow, D. (1992). The encyclopedia of mormonism. New York: Macmillan.
Naess, A. (1953). Interpretation and preciseness. Oslo: I Komission Hos Jacob Dybwad.
Paulsen, D., & Potter, D. (1999) How deep the chasm? A reply to Owen and Mosser’s review. Foundation for ancient research and Mormon studies: review of books, 11(2), 221–264.
Phillips, D. Z. (1970). Death and immortality. New York: Macmillan.
Plantinga, A. (2000). Pluralism: A defense of religious exclusivism. In P. Quinn & K. Meeker (Eds.), The philosophical challenge of religious diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plantinga, C. (1989). Trinity, incarnation and atonement: Philosophical and theological essays. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Priest, G. (2006). Doubt truth to be a liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rahner, K. (1982). Foundations of the Christian faith. New York: The Crossroads Publishing Company.
van Inwagen, P. (2010). We’re right. They’re wrong. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
I received helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Brian Birch, Nathan Kalana-Westbrook, Michael Minch, and (especially) Kevin Schilbrack. I also want to thank audience members at the Society of Christian Philosophers Pacific Division meeting at Westmont College in February 2012 and at the Society for Mormon Philosophy and Theology at Utah State University in September 2012 for their comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Potter, D. Religious disagreement: internal and external. Int J Philos Relig 74, 21–31 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9393-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9393-y