Abstract
Skeptical theism has as its foundation the thesis that if God permits evil, his reasons for doing so will likely be beyond our ken. The only defense given for this thesis is the Parent Analogy. There is in the literature only one defense of this use of the Parent Analogy and it has never been confronted. I examine it and expose serious flaws, thus exposing a crack in the very foundation of skeptical theism.
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Dougherty, T. Reconsidering the parent analogy: unfinished business for skeptical theists. Int J Philos Relig 72, 17–25 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9359-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9359-0