Abstract
At first glance, the properties being omniscient and being worthy of worship might appear to be perfectly co-instantiable. (To say that some properties are co-instantiable is just to say that it is possible that some object instantiate all of them simultaneously. Being entirely red and being a ball are co-instantiable; being entirely red and being entirely blue are not). But there are reasons to be worried about this co-instantiability, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some more plausible than others—that may be offered by the theist.
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Cray, W.D. Omniscience and worthiness of worship. Int J Philos Relig 70, 147–153 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9314-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-011-9314-5