International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

, Volume 70, Issue 3, pp 217–229 | Cite as

Pragmatic encroachment, stakes, and religious knowledge



It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.”


Epistemology Pragmatic encroachment Stakes 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CUNY-LaGuardiaLong Island CityUSA

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