Christian materialism in a scientific age

Article

Abstract

Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the “intermediate state” (if there is one).

Keywords

Type-I materialism Type-II materialism Constitutionalism First-person perspective Technology Resurrection Incarnation Intermediate state 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Baker L. R. (2005) Death and the afterlife. In: Wainwright W. J. (eds) The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp 366–391Google Scholar
  2. Baker L. R. (2007a) The metaphysics of everyday life. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Baker L. R. (2007b) Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection. Religious Studies 43(3): 333–348CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Baker L. R. (2007c) Persons and the natural order. In: Van Inwagen P., Zimmerman D. (eds) Persons: Human and divine. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, pp 261–280Google Scholar
  5. Baker L. R. (2008) A metaphysics of ordinary things and why we need it. Philosophy 83(1): 5–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Baker L. R. (2009) Persons and the extended-mind thesis. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 44(3): 642–658Google Scholar
  7. Baker, L. R. (forthcoming). A not-so-simple simple view. In M. Stefan & G. Gasser (Eds.), Personal identity: Simple or complex? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Bettenson, H. (eds) (1963) Documents of the Christian Church (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
  9. Cooper, J. W. (1988). The identity of resurrected persons: The fatal flaw of monistic anthropology. Calvin Theological Journal, 19–36.Google Scholar
  10. Cooper J. W. (1989) Body, soul, and life everlasing. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, MIGoogle Scholar
  11. Corcoran K. (2001) Physical persons and postmortem survival with temporal gaps. In: Corcoran K. (Ed.), Soul, body and survival. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp 201–217Google Scholar
  12. Merricks T. (1998) There are no criteria of identity over time. Nouse 32(1): 106–124CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Merricks T. (2007) Dualism, physicalism, and the incarnation. In: Van Inwagen P., Zimmerman D. Persons: Human and divine. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, pp 281–300Google Scholar
  14. Mithen S. (2004) Review symposium of Andy Clark’s natural-born cyborgs. Metascience 13(2): 163–169Google Scholar
  15. Plantinga A. (2006) Against materialism. Faith and Philosophy 23(1): 3–32Google Scholar
  16. Sorabji R. (2006) Self: Ancient and modern insights about individuality, life, and death. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, ILGoogle Scholar
  17. Taliaferro, C., & Goetz, S. (2008). The prospect of Christian materialism. Christian Scholar’s Review, 303–321.Google Scholar
  18. Van Inwagen P. (1995) Dualism and materialism: Athens and Jerusalem. Faith and Philosophy 12(4): 475–488Google Scholar
  19. Van Inwagen, P. (2006). I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come (pp. 1–16). http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/Resurrection.doc. Accessed 31 Dec 2010.
  20. Vatican. (1994). Catechism of the Catholic Church. United States Catholic Conference. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vatican.Google Scholar
  21. Zimmerman D. (2002) The constitution of persons by bodies: A critique of Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of material constitution. Philosophical Topics Identity and Individuation 30(1): 295–338Google Scholar
  22. Zimmerman, D. (2004). Christians should affirm mind-body dualism. In Contemporary dialogues in philosophy of religion (pp. 315–327). Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

Personalised recommendations