Praying to stop being an atheist
In this paper, I argue that atheists who think that the issue of God’s existence or non-existence is an important one; assign a greater than negligible probability to God’s existence; and are not in possession of a plausible argument for scepticism about the truth-directedness of uttering such prayers in their own cases, are under a prima facie epistemic obligation to pray to God that He stop them being atheists.
KeywordsGod Prayer Atheism Theism Agnosticism Divine hiddenness Epistemic obligation
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