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Immortality and boredom: a response to Wisnewski

  • Mikel BurleyEmail author
Article

Abstract

This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams’ claim that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality involves periods in which our categorical desires have been exhausted, this need not divest life of meaning since some categorical desires are revivable. I argue that careful reflection upon the thought-experiments adduced by Wisnewski reveals that they do not substantiate his proposal, and hence that a plausible reason for rejecting Williams’ position has not been provided.

Keywords

Bernard Williams J. Jeremy Wisnewski Immortality Boredom Death Desires 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeedsUK

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