Abstract
In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of one’s perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one ‘directly enough’ by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not ‘directly enough’ caused any such experience.
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Mawson, T.J. How can I know I’ve perceived God?. Int J Philos Relig 57, 105–121 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-004-3502-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-004-3502-5