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Product-Line Decisions and Rapid Turnover in Movie Markets

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Abstract

We present empirical evidence on a firm’s decision to eliminate a product from a multi-product line, in a market with rapid product turnover, using weekly micro-level data from a major metropolitan movie market. While film offerings are broadly similar across the market, the timing for removing a specific film varies at the theater level. Theaters are more likely to end a film’s run when the nearest competitor is showing the same film and is owned by the same chain; a film is more likely to survive when the nearest theater is showing the film, but is under different ownership. Theater- and movie-specific factors affect a film’s run length, including the film’s within-theater relative revenues, number of screens, and film rating.

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Notes

  1. Sweeting (2013) uses a structural approach to measure the potential impact of fees for musical performance rights on radio-station formats. Sullivan (2017) constructs counterfactuals to measure the effect of collusion on both product offerings and prices in the super-premium ice cream market. Berry et al. (2016) model endogenous horizontal differentiation in radio markets, with unobserved station-level vertical differentiation, and identify excessive station entry and investment in broadcasting quality. Eizenberg (2014) uses structural parameters to identify the counterfactual effect, on personal computer product lines, from removing the Pentium M chip technology.

  2. Davis (2006b) uses a random-coefficients model to estimate movie demand and shows that quadratic travel costs are significant to consumers, and that theaters have monopoly power within 10 miles of theaters. Chisholm and Norman (2012) find that the competition effect dominates the agglomeration effect in aggregate theater-level attendance data, with the effect diminishing with distance.

  3. Their dataset covers all designated metropolitan areas (DMAs) in this market from September 2003 to December 2004, and the analysis controls for weekly, movie, and theater fixed effects.

  4. The present study focuses on product-level choice, with the unit of analysis film i’s run at theater j: a film-theater pair. Chisholm et al. (2010) construct similarity indexes at the multi-product, theater level in this market and find an average overall weekly percentage match of film showings of 80.4% across theater pairs (this measure is normalized for differences in screen counts). Related work on the effect of competition on product overlap measures, across multi-product firms, includes Berry and Waldfogel (2001), Sweeting (2010), and Orhun et al. (2016).

  5. As documented in the next section, our dataset includes 1,727 film-theater pairs, of which 94 (5.4%) were mid-run at the start of our sample. Re-releases comprise 4.5% of film-theater pairs with start dates during our sample period. The 94% statistic in the text above is relative to the film-theater pairs with start dates during our sample period, excluding re-releases. See Note 39 for further details on national release dates, and Notes 30 and 31 for discussion of left-truncation and how it is addressed in our estimations.

  6. The authors find that the rank of the film’s weekly revenue, relative to the weekly revenue from other films at the same theater, has a significant effect on the film’s survival. In related work on film survival, De Vany and Walls (1997) estimate survival functions for films at the aggregate level (across theaters nationally), with the use of data on the top-50 grossing films in the U.S. Fu (2009) measures the impact of vertical integration, between distributors and theaters, in the Singapore market; films released by non-integrated distributors run longer at independent theaters as compared to vertically integrated theaters. Film survival is more likely if a movie is showing at the nearest theater; this positive survival effect increases with proximity to the rival. Both of these papers, along with Chisholm and Norman (2006), use accelerated failure time (AFT) estimation methods.

  7. Legoux et al. (2016) identify a positive effect of movie reviews on exhibitors’ decisions to continue a film’s run. In the Australian film market, McKenzie (2009) demonstrates a positive relationship between film survival and both critical reviews, and boxoffice revenues in the U.S., using a frailty model.

  8. Two of the authors commissioned a study by Synergy Retail Group to collect the theater-level data that are used here. Synergy’s data sources included Nielsen EDI, as well as local advertisements for theater characteristics. Our analysis covers only first-run theaters in this market; it excludes arthouse and second-run theaters. The geographic scope of the market is limited to an area within or near the I-95 loop around Boston. One first-run theater near the edge of the market was excluded due to limited data on film showings. See Chisholm et al. (2010) for further discussion of theaters in this market.

  9. See Vogel (2015, p. 141) on standard contracts from our period of study.

  10. See Wasko (2003, p. 84). In the context of the relationship between the film producer and the distribution company, “the basic agreement … gives the distributor the right to decide how, where, and when [a] film is distributed” and the promotion and advertising strategy, among other terms. In addition, “[d]ifferent distribution agreements also depend on when and how a film commodity becomes associated with one of the major distributors” (Ibid., p. 86). Films can be developed and produced “in-house”. Alternatively, in a negative pick-up deal, “which can be negotiated before, during, or after production”, a distributor does not fund production, but “often provides an advance to the producer, finances releasing costs … and then the studio and producer share profits” (Ibid., pp.86–87).

  11. See Redstone (2004, p. 394). National Amusements is one of the three movie chains in our dataset; all three chains are major national chains. Redstone further states, in the context of movie exhibition during the period of our study, “Today, since the country is so widely screened … every studio release is generally available in every major city” (Ibid.).

  12. While specific share allocations can vary by film, a sliding payment scale, increasingly in favor of the exhibitor, is a common feature of distributor-exhibitor contracts during this period. See Filson et al. (2005) and Gil and Lafontaine (2012) for studies of share contracts in film exhibition in the U.S. (St. Louis) and Spain, respectively.

  13. For further discussion of typical distributor-exhibitor contracts during this time period see Vogel (2015, pp. 140–144) and Redstone (2004, pp. 393–395). In their study of exhibition contracts in the St. Louis market during a similar time period, Filson et al., (2005, p. 355) note that the payment to the distributor can reach as low as 30% at the end of a film’s run.

  14. De Vany and Walls (1997, p. 785) note a common minimum run length of four weeks; with “six to eight week minimums sometimes used”. Contracts from this time period also typically include holdover clauses that require theaters to continue a film’s run if the prior week’s revenue exceeds a benchmark value (Vogel, 2015, p. 143). See Wasko (2003, pp. 111–112) and Vogel (2015, p. 143, 175) for discussions of the renegotiation process to end a film’s run early. Wasko further notes “Renegotiation occurs mainly because distributors want to maintain good relations with exhibitors”. As shown in Fig. 1, it is common, in practice, for theaters to end a film’s run prior to four weeks.

  15. See Orhun et al. (2016) and De Vany and Walls (1997) for further discussion of related tradeoffs, with more broad geographic coverage, and more variation in film adoption timing.

  16. For each film, we determine whether the film is a major holiday release, when a relatively smaller number of “tentpole” films, which are expected to perform well at the boxoffice, are typically released. We also include the number of national theaters in which each film is released to control for a related effect, using data from boxofficemojo.com and the-numbers.com. Further, we include seasonal controls for each film’s release date (spring, summer, fall, and winter). Major holidays include Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Memorial Day. A Holiday Release, in the first three cases, is a film whose national release date is within the Friday-to-Thursday period that includes the holiday (e.g., a film released on Friday, Dec. 22, is a holiday release for the Monday Christmas holiday). A Holiday Release for Memorial Day is a film released in the Friday-to-Thursday period a week prior to the holiday, reflecting the common industry practice of releasing tentpole films during the week prior to this holiday.

  17. Rising star status is based on reports by industry observers in the Hollywood Reporter in 1999 (the year prior to the start of our sample period).

  18. We discuss Total User Reviews and User Score in Sect. 5.2 in our analysis of word-of-mouth effects.

  19. Figure 1 includes run lengths for each film, at each theater, for all film-theater pairs with completed runs in our sample; right-censored film-theater pairs, with films still running at the end of our sample period, are excluded.

  20. In Table 2, note that the maximum value of %Of Theater Weekly Revenue is 79%. This observation applies to a major holiday release film, and to that film’s performance during that holiday week, at a theater with five screens (the minimum number in our sample); only three other films were exhibited at the theater during this week. The high percentage of revenue earned by this film, at this theater, during this week, illustrates how theaters may choose to allocate their screen capacity to accommodate a film’s playing on more than one screen, when they assess revenue potential to be high. See further discussion of this variable, and its relevance to the exhibitor’s decision to drop a film from its offerings, in Sect. 5.

  21. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) identify similar endogeneity issues in the context of entry. An additional potential source of endogeneity is the spatial distribution of movie theaters in the market, which raises the possibility of correlation between the location and the error term in EQ-1. We include theater fixed effects as a robustness check for our baseline estimation to follow to address this point (see Note 46).

  22. That is, given that a film survives at a theater until time t, how does the instantaneous likelihood of exit compare to the likelihood of surviving beyond time t? See Greene (2018, pp. 967–968).

  23. The Cox model is based on the assumption of a time-invariant hazard ratio. For example, if a treated group is ten times more likely to experience a hazard, in the initial time period, as compared to a non-treated group, then the treated group will be ten times more likely to experience the hazard at all other points in time. If this treatment effect is indicated by the covariate k, the line plotting \({\beta }_{k}\left(t\right)\) against time should result in a line with slope zero. The Schoenfeld residual compares the value of the covariate k, for a given subject who has experienced the hazard, and has exited the sample at a given time t, to the predicted value of the covariate at time t. The global test for the validity of the proportional hazards assumption uses scaled Schoenfeld residuals, following Grambsch and Therneau (1994). See also https://www.stata.com/manuals/ststcoxph-assumptiontests.pdf for further technical details of the test.

  24. See Cleves et al., (2016, p. 246), and Stata 16 Survival Analysis Reference Manual,  Stata Corp. (2019), pp. 276–277.

  25. When the distribution of z is the extreme-value density, this model yields an exponential or Weibull regression. For the normal or logistic error distributions, the regression is lognormal or log-logistic; these two distributions are appropriate when the data are consistent with hazard rates that initially rise and then fall. In the case of a film’s run at a movie theater, this hazard pattern would imply that films are at high risk of exit early in their runs, but at relatively lower risk if they survive beyond this early high-risk period.

  26. See Stata 16 Survival Analysis Reference Manual,  Stata Corp. (2019), pp. 276–280 and pp. 286–288.

  27. For this test, we estimate the Cox proportional-hazards model with the use of the covariates that were presented in Sect. 3; these independent variables are the same as those that are used in the baseline regression that is reported in the next section (Table 3, Regression I). The baseline findings with the Cox model are qualitatively consistent with the AFT estimation results, with some differences in significance levels. See Note 23 for a discussion of the Schoenfeld test.

  28. For this test, we compare the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the Weibull, exponential, lognormal, and log-logistic regression models; we use the same covariates as in the Cox proportional-hazards test above. The lognormal specification yields the lowest AIC value.

  29. For left-truncated and right-censored subjects, the number of observations will be less than Tij,; these two issues are discussed next, and in the following two footnotes.

  30. Out of 1,727 subjects (film-theater pairs), 94–5.4%—were mid-run at the start of our sample period (left-truncated); 111–6.4%—had not yet completed their full runs by the end of our sample period (right-censored). One film began its run close to the start of our sample, with some showings during the two days prior to the start of our sample period; we treat this film as beginning its first run week at the start of our sample period.

  31. See Stata 16 Survival Analysis Reference Manual, Stata Corp. (2019), pp. 302–304 for further discussion of the log-likelihood function in case of right-censoring, and p. 19 and p. 410 for the case of left-truncation. See also Greene (2018, pp. 918–980), for a more general methodological discussion of censoring and truncation.

  32. Specifically, we estimate the linear time model (with endogeneity correction); negative binomial regression; ordered probit; and Cox proportional hazards.

  33. A formal derivation of time ratios and a discussion of their interpretation are presented in Appendix 2.

  34. The present study’s focus is more finely grained and is at the film-specific theater level, rather than at the combined, multi-product theater level. This focus allows us to examine product-level effects of ownership.

  35. This interaction effect is also negative, although smaller, with the second- and third-nearest neighbors, and is significant in the third-nearest neighbor case.

  36. As was discussed in Sect. 3, the distributor develops the release strategy and timing for new films.

  37. De Vany and Walls (1999; 2004) document the high degree of uncertainty in predicting movie boxoffice revenue outcomes.

  38. See Notes 16 and 39 for further discussion of national opening weekend theater counts and national release dates.

  39. We identified the national release date for each of the 183 films in our dataset using the-numbers.com and boxofficemojo.com: 90.2% were classified as wide releases. Limited releases (8.2%) opened on a smaller number of screens nationally, with a slower build of screens over time; for these films we used the start of the national limited release as the national release date. For limited releases in the first week, with immediate wide release following in the second week of the national run (1.6%), we used the national wide release date as the national release date. Three films had limited national release in December, followed by wide release in January; these films were included in the wide releases, and the national wide release date was treated as the national release date. See Note 16 for further discussion of major holiday releases.

  40. As was noted in Sect. 2, 94 % of theater-specific film runs in our sample begin within the first week of the film’s national opening (see Note 5). Thus, if the film is not showing at the neighboring theater in the current week, the film has either previously exited from the neighboring theater, or will likely never show at the neighboring theater in this market.

  41. We repeat the estimation in Regression III, replacing Distance to Nearest for the three nearest-neighboring theaters with the log of these distances. The qualitative findings remain the same, with the coefficients on the log of distance to the second- and third-nearest neighbors retaining their signs, both significant at the .05 level.

  42. In the discussion of alternative independent variables that follows in this subsection, we use Regression II in Table 3 as our baseline reference. As is noted in Table 3, our estimations include a control for average household income within a 3-mile radius of a theater, for each film-theater pair. The main qualitative findings from our baseline remain when we further add a control for population within a 3-mile radius of a theater, for each film-theater pair.

  43. Further, we find a negative and significant effect of the length of time between the current period, t, and the nearest holiday (whether preceding, or following, t). While the AFT specification accommodates potential time dependency of survival, we split the data into two groups: between observations early in a film’s run (four weeks and earlier) and later (five weeks and later). We repeat the baseline regression on each group, and the main qualitative findings hold. For Show at Nearest, expected survival time increases by 28% for the early group, and by only 16% for the later group. For Same Chain Nearest, expected survival time increases by 29% (early group) and 15% (later group). The effect of Show at Nearest*Same Chain is negative in both groups, with survival time decreasing by 22% for the early group, and by 14% for the later group. Similar results hold when the early cutoff is five weeks and six weeks.

  44. We also consider additional movie characteristics: When we add fixed effects for film genre (action, animation, comedy, drama), we find insignificant effects. The baseline regression includes a control for the number of theaters in which a film was released nationally during its opening weekend. We replace this variable with the national boxoffice revenue that is generated during a film’s opening weekend. In both cases, the effect on a film’s run length is positive and significant.

  45. The correlation between Number of Screens and Stadium is 0.6523; between Number of Screens and Digital, it is 0.4581.

  46. The main qualitative findings remain when we add theater fixed effects, with the notable exception that Number of Screens becomes statistically and economically insignificant.

  47. Further, we consider the patterns in the neighboring ownership variables, by grouping all observations in the dataset by chain. (As discussed in Sect. 4.4, the total number of observations in the dataset is based on the full runs of all film-theater pairs.) We find that for Chain 1, all nearest neighbors are different-owned; the means of Same Chain Second and Same Chain Third are 0.13 and 0.31, respectively. For Chain 2, the mean of Same Chain Nearest is 0.25, the mean of Same Chain Third is 0.67, and all of the second-nearest neighbors are different-owned. For Chain 3, all first- and third-nearest neighbors are different-owned; and the mean of Same Chain Second is 0.42.

  48. For example, for the Chain 1 subsample, the mean of the dummy variable Same Chain Nearest is 0 (see Note 47); this variable will be collinear with the constant term.

  49. Specifically, we repeat the baseline regression, using the same independent variables, with the following exceptions. For the Chain 2 subsample, since this chain has both same- and different-owned nearest neighbors (but only different-owned second-nearest neighbors), we limit the following independent variables to just the nearest neighbor: whether the film is showing at the neighbor; whether the neighbor is same-owned; and the related interaction terms. For the Chains 1 and 3 subsamples, we adopt a similar approach, except we limit the neighbor variables to only those for the second-nearest neighbor (see Note 47).

  50. Specifically, in the Chain 2 subsample, we find that Show at Nearest increases the likelihood of a film’s continuing its run, whereas Show at Nearest * Same Chain [Nearest] decreases the likelihood of survival. The results are significant beyond the .05 and .01 levels, respectively. Similar findings hold for the Chain 1 subsample, with Show at Second positively affecting the likelihood of a film’s continued survival, and Show at Second * Same Chain [Second] decreasing the likelihood of survival. The first result is significant beyond the .01 level; the second result is insignificant (p-value 0.22). For the Chain 3 subsample, these effects are insignificant.

  51. We also consider whether the identity of the nearest chain matters. We repeat the regressions in Note 49 with the following changes: For the Chain 2 subsample, we add a dummy variable for whether Chain 1 (and then Chain 3) is the nearest neighbor, and exclude Same Chain Nearest, due to multicollinearity (when Same Chain Nearest equals 0, either Chain 1 or Chain 3 is the nearest neighbor; when Same Chain Nearest equals 1, neither is the nearest neighbor). We find that the effect of nearest neighbor’s chain identity is insignificant. We repeat the estimation for the Chains 1 and 3 subsamples (now excluding Same Chain Second). For Chain 1, we find that the identity of the nearest neighbor has an insignificant effect. For Chain 3, the neighbor-identity effect is significant, just beyond the .10 level: Chain 1 as nearest neighbor increases the likelihood of a film’s survival; Chain 2 has the opposite effect.

  52. The baseline regression here refers to the estimation described in Note 42.

  53. See Fig. 1 and Note 19.

  54. For this single-record specification, each observation corresponds to the full run of film i, at theater j; the dependent variable is total run length—Tij—as in the linear specification of EQ-1. The observations cover film-theater pairs that completed their full runs during our sample period, and thus for which Tij is known (see Note 30). We use the same independent variables as in Regression I of Table 3, but with the modifications that are noted here, due to the change to the single-record specification. Show at Nearest now equals 1 if film i showed at the neighbor at any point during film i’s run at theater j; Show at Second and Show at Third are analogously defined for the second- and third-nearest neighbors. %Of Weekly Theater Revenue is replaced by the percentage of total revenue generated at theater j, during film i’s entire run there, earned by film i.

  55. We also consider a range of alternative categorical cutoffs, including eight weeks or more (covering 14.4% of observations), as well as 10 and 11 weeks or more. The main findings are consistent with those for the nine weeks or more cutoff. Since the duration of a film’s run, measured in weeks, can be treated as count data, we also estimate the negative binomial model, with the use of the same single-record specification as for the ordered probit. The main findings follow those for the ordered probit analysis; however, while Same Chain Nearest remains positive, it is now insignificant (p-value 0.15).

  56. The dependent variable is log of total run length (Tij). Note that Tij is right-censored for films that are still running at the end of our sample period. Since the boundary value for run length is not fixed, we do not estimate a standard tobit; instead we drop the small number of affected observations for the ordered probit (see Notes 19 and 30).

  57. To test for differences in our main findings across chains, we conduct a Chow test: We repeat the ordinary least squares estimation, accommodating for the multicollinearity of the same-ownership variables that we detailed in Sect. 5.2, and in Notes 47 and 48. Specifically, we use the same covariates as in Regression I of Table 3; but for neighbor variables, we include only the first-nearest neighbor Show at Nearest variable, as defined in Note 54; we exclude the same-owner dummy variable and the ownership interaction terms. We estimate least squares for the pooled regression, then for the subsamples, by chain. The Chow test rejects the null of equal coefficients across subsamples at the .01 level. For the Chains 1 and 2 groups, Show at Nearest is positive, and is significant for only the Chain 2 group (at the .01 level). For the Chain 3 group, Show at Nearest is negative and significant, just beyond the .10 level (p-value 0.08).

  58. We use the same single-record data that were described in Note 54, in which each observation corresponds to the full run of film i, at theater j. We use the same independent variables as in Regression I of Table 3, but include only the first-nearest neighbor variables in this instrumental-variables extension to avoid underidentification of the coefficient on the endogenous Show at Nearest variable. The instrument—Number of Opening Theaters Nationally – is significant in the first-stage regression (t-value 9.10), and is not included as an independent variable in the second-stage regression. The dependent variable in the second stage is the log of film i’s run length at theater j.

  59. See Rodríguez (2010, pp. 8–9).

  60. This derivation follows Cleves et al., (2016, p. 243). See also “Time-To-Event Data Analysis,” Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health Population Health Methods (Retrieved June 3, 2020) https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/time-event-data-analysis on interpreting time ratios.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the DeSantis Center for Motion Picture Industry Studies of Florida Atlantic University College of Business for funding this research and to Synergy Retail for compiling a portion of the dataset used in this paper; to Oleg Moskatov for his careful research assistance; to the Editor Lawrence J. White, and two anonymous referees, for valuable comments; and to Jonathan Haughton, Toomas Hinnosaar, Sanjiv Jaggia, Jongbyung Jun, Mikhail Klimenko, Stephen Martin, Marc Rysman, Harold Vogel, and seminar and conference participants at Brandeis, Northeastern, Suffolk University, Cambridge University, University of British Columbia, the Mallen Economics of Filmed Entertainment Conference, the International Industrial Organization Conference, and the Allied Social Sciences Association Conference, for helpful suggestions. The views that are expressed in this paper represent the authors’ alone.

Funding

The DeSantis Center for Motion Picture Industry Studies of Florida Atlantic University College of Business provided funding to D. Chisholm and G. Norman for this research and to compensate Synergy Retail for compiling a portion of the dataset that is used in this paper.

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Correspondence to Darlene C. Chisholm.

Appendices

Appendix 1

In the accelerated failure time (AFT) model, the survival function for an individual with covariates X is \(S\left( {t{|}{\varvec{X}}} \right) = S_{0} \left( {\exp \left\{ { - {{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} }} \right\}t} \right).\) This survival function is related to the linear regression equation

$${\text{ln}}t = {{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} } + z.$$
(4)

The error term, z, represents the baseline distribution of \({\text{ln}}t\) when the covariates equal zero.

Following Rodríguez (2010), define \(T_{0} = \exp \left\{ z \right\}\) for this baseline case. The probability that the baseline individual survives beyond time t is

$$S_{0} \left( t \right) = \Pr \left\{ {T_{0} > {\text{t}}} \right\} = { }\Pr \{ \exp \left\{ {\text{z}} \right\} > {\text{t}}\} = {\text{Pr}}\{ z > {\text{ln}}t\} .$$
(5)

Exponentiating both sides of EQ-4 implies that T is distributed according to

$$\exp \left\{ {{{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} } + z} \right\} = \exp \left\{ {{{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} }} \right\}\exp \left\{ z \right\} = T_{0} {\text{exp}}\left\{ {{{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} }} \right\}.$$
(6)

Thus, the covariates have this multiplicative effect on the baseline survival time. It follows from EQ-6 that the probability of survival beyond time t, given covariates X, is

$$S\left( {t{|}{\varvec{X}}} \right) = \Pr \{ T > t|{\varvec{X}}\} = \Pr \left\{ {T_{0} \exp \left\{ {{{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} }} \right\} > t} \right\},$$
(7)
$$S\left( {t{|}{\varvec{X}}} \right) = \Pr \left\{ {T_{0} > \exp \left\{ { - {{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} }} \right\}t} \right\}.$$
(8)

EQ-8, with EQ-5, implies that \(S\left( {t{|}{\varvec{X}}} \right) = S_{0} \left( {\exp \left\{ { - {{\varvec X}^{\prime}{\varvec \beta} }} \right\}t} \right)\), which is the AFT specification.Footnote 59

Appendix 2

As was shown in Appendix 1, the estimated parameters in the AFT model measure the multiplicative effect of covariates on baseline survival time. Exponentiating an estimated coefficient gives a time ratio. This ratio compares the survival time that is associated with a one-unit change in the covariate, to the survival time prior to the change, as follows.Footnote 60

Consider the linear regression equation, EQ-4, in Appendix 1. Exponentiating both sides gives the following survival time, for subject j, with a given set of covariates \({\varvec{X}} = \left( {X_{1} \ldots X_{k} } \right)\):

$$t_{j} = {\text{exp}}\left( {\beta _{1} X_{1} + \cdots + \beta _{k} X_{k} } \right)T_{j} .$$
(9)

In the case of a one-unit increase in \(X_{1}\), for example, the new survival time would be

$$t_{j}^{*} = {\text{exp}}\left( {\beta_{1} \left( {X_{1} + 1} \right) + \cdots + \beta_{k} X_{k} } \right)T_{j} .$$
(10)

The time ratio measures \(t_{j}^{*}\) relative to \(t_{j}\) as follows:

$$\frac{{t_{j}^{*} }}{{t_{j} }} = \left[ {\exp \left( {\beta_{1} \left( {X_{1} + 1} \right) + \cdots + \beta_{k} X_{k} } \right)T_{j} } \right]/[\exp \left( {\beta_{1} X_{1} + \ldots + \beta_{k} X_{k} } \right)T_{j} ] = \exp \left( {\beta_{1} } \right).$$
(11)

Thus exponentiating the coefficient estimate from the AFT regression gives the factor by which survival time increases for a one-unit increase in the covariate. A time ratio that is greater than one implies that the covariate lengthens expected survival time; a time ratio that is less than one indicates that the covariate shortens the survival time, which implies that an earlier exit is more likely.

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Liu, YH., Chisholm, D.C. & Norman, G. Product-Line Decisions and Rapid Turnover in Movie Markets. Rev Ind Organ 62, 341–365 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09901-5

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