Managerial Control and Executive Compensation

  • F. M. SchererEmail author


This article analyzes the trajectory and causes of the explosion of American corporate CEOs’ compensation relative to that of average workers between 1958 and 2017. The historical data are presented and analyzed in more detail for 2016 and 2017. Important biases in alternative data sets are explored. Alternative hypotheses for the dramatic changes over time are proposed but not resolved. Among other things, the paper investigates the role of tax and other government policy changes and regulation-induced innovations in the organization of executive pay determination.


Corporate governance Managerial compensation Principal–agent problem 

JEL Classification

G34 L21 M12 M52 



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kennedy School of GovernmentHarvard University (Emeritus)CambridgeUSA

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