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Institutional Design of Select Competition Authorities in South Asia: Identifying Challenges and Opportunities

Abstract

The development of a robust competition regime that ensures effective implementation of competition policy principles and promotes creation of a healthy competition culture depends on several factors. Primarily, it demands ‘optimally designed’ institutions. The South Asian block depicts a wide array of challenges and opportunities in this regard, and we attempt to offer an in-depth analysis into the designs of competition authorities in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. From this, an important stage-specific ‘framework of challenges and opportunities’ emerges and is presented to sensitize emerging jurisdictions about the general nature of obstacles and help identify possible focus areas for design optimisation.

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Fig. 1

Source: Mehta (2007, p. 55)

Fig. 2
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Fig. 5

Notes

  1. 1.

    See UNCTAD, ‘Why competition and consumer protection matter’, available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/why-competition-matters.aspx and OECD, ‘Competition Assessment Toolkit, Principles’, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/46193173.pdf.

  2. 2.

    However, the connection between increased competition and investment has been fraught with debate. For a brief on the matter, see Dube (2009).

  3. 3.

    See CUTS International (2015), ‘Making Competition Reforms Work for the People, Evidence from Select Developing Countries & Sectors’, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/crew/pdf/Making_Competition_Reforms_Work_for_People-Evidence_from_Select_Developing_Countries_and_Sectors.pdf and Godfrey (2008, p. 3).

  4. 4.

    More than 130 countries/jurisdictions have laws that seek to safeguard and foster market competition. See (Aydin and Büthe 2016, p. 2).

  5. 5.

    There can of course be exceptions to this. Several jurisdictions combine competition enforcement with consumer protection.

  6. 6.

    Here, the term ‘competition policy’ is being used as an overarching term that covers competition law. Both ‘competition policy’ and ‘competition law’ are often used interchangeably, but there is a distinction between the two. See Mehta (2007, p. 43).

  7. 7.

    See OECD (2015), ‘Key points of the Roundtables on Changes in Institutional Design’, available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M(2015)1/ANN9/FINAL&docLanguage=En and UNCTAD (2008), ‘Independence and Accountability of Competition Authorities’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Ninth Session 15–18 July, TD/B/COM.2/CLP/67.

  8. 8.

    See CUTS International’s project websites for the four phases of the 7Up project, available at www.cuts-ccier.org/7Up1; www.cuts-ccier.org/7Up2; www.cuts-ccier.org/7Up3 and www.cuts-ccier.org/7up4.

  9. 9.

    For a detailed insight into the practical interrelationship between politics and regulatory/institutional development, see Mehta and Evenett (2009).

  10. 10.

    See OECD (2015), ‘Key points of the Roundtables on Changes in Institutional Design’, available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M(2015)1/ANN9/FINAL&docLanguage=En.

  11. 11.

    See UNCTAD, ‘Model Law on Competition’, available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf7d8_exerpt_en.pdf.

  12. 12.

    See UNCTAD (2008), ‘Independence and Accountability of Competition Authorities’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Ninth Session 15–18 July, TD/B/COM.2/CLP/67.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    This paper will focus on de jure independence as well as provide evidence on de facto independence wherever possible. For more on these concepts, see Background Paper by the Secretariat for OECD Global Forum on Competition (2016), ‘Independence of Competition Authorities - From Designs to Practices’, available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=daf/comp/gf(2016)5&doclanguage=en and Guidi (2012).

  16. 16.

    See ICN (2012), ‘Advocacy and Competition Policy’, available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc358.pdf; See UNCTAD (2008), ‘Independence and Accountability of Competition Authorities’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Ninth Session 15–18 July, TD/B/COM.2/CLP/67 and CUTS International (2013), ‘Competition Reforms In Key Markets For Enhancing Social & Economic Welfare In Developing Countries’, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/crew/Advocacy.htm.

  17. 17.

    For more on the concept of globalisation and unbundling, see Baldwin (2016).

  18. 18.

    See the Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law available at https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf.

  19. 19.

    See CUTS International, ‘Competition and Regulatory Overlaps: The Case of India’, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/IICA/pdf/Country_Paper_India.pdf.

  20. 20.

    For details about the Competition Commission of India, see http://www.cci.gov.in/about-cci.

  21. 21.

    COMPAT was established through the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007. Notably, the Government of India has notified that on and from 26th May, 2017, any appeal, application, or proceeding pending before the COMPAT shall stand transferred to National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). The detailed procedure as to how this will play out will expectantly follow soon. Implications of this have been discussed subsequently. For more, visit http://compat.nic.in/upload/Notification%20attached%20here%20under.pdf and http://compat.nic.in/.

  22. 22.

    See Section 49 of the Competition Act 2002.

  23. 23.

    See the Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law, available at https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf.

  24. 24.

    See Sections 7 and 8(1) of the Competition Act, 2002.

  25. 25.

    Previously, the selection process was reliant on the procedure as prescribed by the Central Government. However, after the Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Brahm Dutt v. UOI (discussed below), several structural changes were made including the appointment procedure.

  26. 26.

    The Competition Act (Amendment) Bill, 2012 proposes to separate the selection process of the Chairperson from that of the members. In the proposed amendment, the Chairperson would be selected by the same Selection Committee. However, the members of CCI would be selected by a Selection Committee that would also consist of the Chairperson himself, apart from CJI, the Secretary in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice, and one expert of repute. If passed by the legislature, the Bill would strengthen the role and powers of the Chairperson substantially.

  27. 27.

    See Rule 4(4).

  28. 28.

    See Section 55 of the Competition Act, 2002.

  29. 29.

    The underlying rationale is perhaps to ensure checks and balances on the Commission.

  30. 30.

    In this regard, the South African experience is noteworthy. South Africa’s competition law was transformed in 1999, with the coming into effect of the current Competition Act, 1998. This statute introduced the somewhat unusual element of public interest in competition law. The concept of public interest is woven into the fabric of the Act. Even in the preamble, it is noted that, given the injustices of the past, the objectives of the Act include providing all South Africans with equal opportunity to participate fairly in the economy and regulating the transfer of economic ownership in keeping with the public interest. The concept of public interest is carried through into the prohibited practices provisions, where one of the grounds for exempting otherwise anticompetitive conduct from the provisions of the Act is that it promotes the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive.

  31. 31.

    See the Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law (p. 20, pp 3.2.0), available at https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf.

  32. 32.

    All notifications are available at http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/competitionact.html. In one of these instances, exemption has been provided for a term of 10 years. For details, see http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Notification_31082017.pdf.

  33. 33.

    See Section 53A of the Competition Act, 2002.

  34. 34.

    The Central Government’s power is restricted to filing an appeal if it is not satisfied with the Commission’s decision.

  35. 35.

    See The Business Standard, ‘Govt. to scrap 8 appellate tribunals; NCLAT to take over COMPAT's duties’, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/govt-to-scrap-8-appellate-tribunals-nclat-to-take-over-compat-s-duties-117032200553_1.html.

  36. 36.

    See Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr, Writ Petition 15147–15148 of 2017.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    (2010) 10 SCC 744, available at: http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=36828. In this landmark judgement, the apex court’s judicious oversight effectively demarcated the boundaries of exercise of power of both CCI and COMPAT and demystified ambiguities regarding the extent of such powers. For a summary, see Sobti and Chaudhary (2010).

  39. 39.

    Civil Appeal No. 2480 of 2014, available at: https://barandbench.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/excel-crop-v-cci.pdf. The Supreme Court in this landmark judgement upheld the decision of COMPAT and held that the penalty for anticompetitive practices that were found to be in violation of the Competition Act should be on the basis of “relevant turnover” that relate to the particular product, and not on the total turnover on multi-product companies. This essentially moulded CCI’s procedure of levying penalties and made the procedure more accountable and less arbitrary.

  40. 40.

    See Section 52 of the Competition Act, 2002.

  41. 41.

    See the Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law (p. 20, pp 6.1.5), available at https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf.

  42. 42.

    See LiveMint, ‘Seven large penalties imposed by CCI’, available at http://www.livemint.com/Politics/28q9vf3FP7bU8JaIPpX0pL/Seven-large-penalties-imposed-by-CCI.html.

  43. 43.

    See for instance, the issues that were raised in In Re: Alleged cartelization by steel producers. Case No.: RTPE No. 09 of 2008, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/092008_0.pdf.

  44. 44.

    To see all initiatives of CCI, see http://www.cci.gov.in/glimpses-competition-advocacy-initiatives.

  45. 45.

    See Section 18 of the Competition Act, 2002.

  46. 46.

    There is already a draft National Competition Policy, 2011 (NCP, 2011) formulated by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, but it has not been adopted by the Cabinet. It is available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Revised_Draft_National_Competition_Policy_2011_17nov2011.pdf.

  47. 47.

    See Brahm Dutt v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 431. The essential challenge was on the basis that the Competition Commission envisaged by the Act was more of a judicial body having adjudicatory powers on questions of importance and legalistic in nature. In the background of the doctrine of separation of powers recognized by the Indian Constitution, the right to appoint the judicial members of the Commission should rest with the Chief Justice of India or his nominee and further the Chairman of the Commission had necessarily to be a retired Chief Justice or Judge of the Supreme Court or of the High Court, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India or by a Committee presided over by the Chief Justice of India. In other words, the contention was that the Chairman of the Commission had to be a person connected with the judiciary who was picked for the job by the head of the judiciary and it should not be a bureaucrat or other person appointed by the executive without reference to the head of the judiciary (p. 3). Notably, the apex court gave the Central government an opportunity to fix this irregularity and held that “it would be appropriate to postpone a decision on the question after the amendments, if any, to the Act are carried out and without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to approach this Court again with specific averments …” (p. 5).

  48. 48.

    See Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India (pending), WP (C) No. 6610 of 2014 (Del).

  49. 49.

    See Injeti Srinivas, Secretary, Ministry of Corporate affairs addressing the audience at CCI Annual Lecture 2018, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tva6EtzrD8Y&feature=youtu.be.

  50. 50.

    See the Financial Express, ‘Competition Law: Regulatory conflicts to ease in redrafting’, available at http://snip.ly/1oi9kg/https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/competition-law-regulatory-conflicts-to-ease-in-redrafting/1174899/.

  51. 51.

    See CUTS International (2013), ‘Policy distortions hurt competition and growth in India-A CUTS Research Report’, available at http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Policy_distortions_hurt_competition_and_growth_in_India-A_CUTS_Research_report.pdf.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    Ibid.

  54. 54.

    This recommendation is an embodiment and extension of general suggestions which were put forth by Mehta (2013).

  55. 55.

    For details, refer to discussion in Sect. 1.2.1.

  56. 56.

    See more about the Competition Commission of Pakistan at http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59&Itemid=103&lang=en.

  57. 57.

    See the World Bank (2007), ‘A Framework for a New Competition Policy and Law for Pakistan’, Finance and Private Sector Development Unit and Department for International Development.

  58. 58.

    See the Preamble of the Competition Act, 2010.

  59. 59.

    See UNCTAD (2013), ‘Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan’, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013/14, 3.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    See Section 12(2) of the Competition Act, 2010.

  62. 62.

    See Section 28(a) of the Competition Act, 2010.

  63. 63.

    See Section 12 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  64. 64.

    See the World Bank (2007, p. 5), ‘A Framework for a New Competition Policy and Law for Pakistan’, Finance and Private Sector Development Unit and Department for International Development.

  65. 65.

    See the World Bank (2007, p. 7), ‘A Framework for a New Competition Policy and Law for Pakistan’, Finance and Private Sector Development Unit and Department for International Development, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/875361468283497835/Pakistan-A-framework-for-a-new-competition-policy-and-law.

  66. 66.

    See Section 12(3) of the Competition Act, 2010.

  67. 67.

    See the Background Paper by the Secretariat for OECD Global Forum on Competition (2016, p. 11), ‘Independence of Competition Authorities - From Designs to Practices’, available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=daf/comp/gf(2016)5&doclanguage=en.

  68. 68.

    See the Constitution Petition No. 59 of 2011 and CMAs Nos. 326 and 633 of 2012 and Crl. O. P. 94 of 2012 in Const. P. 59/2011, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Const.P.59of2011dt-9-4-2013.pdf.

  69. 69.

    See Section 14(2) of the Competition Act, 2010.

  70. 70.

    For instance, see recent advertisement available at http://finance.gov.pk/jobs/adv_26022017.pdf.

  71. 71.

    See notification by the CCP vis-à-vis appointment of two CCP members through a competitive process, available at http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=523&Itemid=137&lang=en.

  72. 72.

    Unlike Pakistan, several jurisdictions— such as Canada and Norway—follow the non-collegial system and have an individual at the top of the management.

  73. 73.

    Section 14(2), which states that, “The Members shall be appointed by the Federal Government and from amongst the Members of the Commission, the Federal Government shall appoint the Chairman."

  74. 74.

    See Section 14(4), which states that, “Not more than two Members of the Commission shall be employees of the Federal Government”.

  75. 75.

    See Section 20 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  76. 76.

    See UNCTAD (2013, p. 12), ‘Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan’, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013/14.

  77. 77.

    See the Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement 2017, Pakistan's Competition Commission’, available at https://globalcompetitionreview.com/benchmarking/rating-enforcement-2017/1144843/pakistans-competition-commission.

  78. 78.

    Notably, the phrase “Although the CCP is still operating under significant financial constraints,” has found its way into two consecutive Annual Reports (2011 and 2012) and as per the Chairperson’s remarks in 2010, “continuous fiscal constraints and struggle for financial autonomy which directly has impact on our survival as well as sustainability” depicts one of the greatest challenges that the Commission had to face in its initial years of operation. All annual reports are available at http://cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254&Itemid=166&lang=en.

  79. 79.

    It is pertinent to note that the concept of accountability is not limited to judicial accountability, but for the sake of uniform assessment it has been taken as an indicator. For a broader view on accountability, see (Kovacic and Winerman 2015, p. 2090).

  80. 80.

    As per Section 41(3) of the Competition Act, 2010, in case of a split decision between members, the original decision would hold.

  81. 81.

    See Section 43 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  82. 82.

    See the Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement 2017, Pakistan's Competition Commission’, available at https://globalcompetitionreview.com/benchmarking/rating-enforcement-2017/1144843/pakistans-competition-commission.

  83. 83.

    See Section 21 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  84. 84.

    See Section 22 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  85. 85.

    See Section 22(2) of the Competition Act, 2010.

  86. 86.

    All reports are available at

    http://cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=254&Itemid=166&lang=en.

  87. 87.

    This is unlike its Indian counterpart, where a separate office of the Director General is established to conduct investigations.

  88. 88.

    See Section 33 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  89. 89.

    See Section 34 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  90. 90.

    See Section 58 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  91. 91.

    This includes orders by the Appellate Benches.

  92. 92.

    All decisions and orders are available at http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=168&Itemid=106&lang=en.

  93. 93.

    See the Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement 2017, Pakistan's Competition Commission’, available at https://globalcompetitionreview.com/benchmarking/rating-enforcement-2017/1144843/pakistans-competition-commission.

  94. 94.

    Ibid.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    See Section 29 of the Competition Act, 2010.

  97. 97.

    The CCG meets quarterly to discuss matters related to competition and consists of several regulatory bodies such as The Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA); Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), National Energy & Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA), State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). See ‘Competition Commission of Pakistan, The Competition Consultative Group’, available at

    http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=176&Itemid=50&lang=en.

  98. 98.

    For all competition advocacy initiatives, see http://www.cc.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=64&Itemid=130&lang=en.

  99. 99.

    See UNCTAD (2013, p. 13), ‘Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan’, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013/14.

  100. 100.

    Validated through CUTS International’s experience from various advocacy initiatives, see http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Reforming_Competition_Law_Regimes_in_the_Developing_World_through_the_7Up_Programme.pdf; http://www.cuts-ccier.org/7Up2/ and Sengupta and Dube (2008).

  101. 101.

    See UNCTAD (2013, p. 13), ‘Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan’, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2013/14.

  102. 102.

    See The News International, ‘Lack of funds major challenge for CCP’, available at https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/310496-lack-of-funds-major-challenge-for-ccp.

  103. 103.

    See the Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement 2017, Pakistan's Competition Commission’, available at https://globalcompetitionreview.com/benchmarking/rating-enforcement-2017/1144843/pakistans-competition-commission.

  104. 104.

    See Vertex Chamber’ s Law Note (2013), ‘Comparing Apples and Oranges – the problem with the Competition Act 2012’, available at http://www.vertexchambers.com/LawNotes/LawNote%201_February%202013.pdf.

  105. 105.

    See US Department of State, ‘2015 Investment Climate Statement – Bangladesh’, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241475.htm#10.

  106. 106.

    Ibid.

  107. 107.

    See The Dhaka Tribune, ‘No Commission, no enforcement’, available at http://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2013/08/01/no-commission-no-enforcement/.

  108. 108.

    See Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  109. 109.

    See Section 7(2) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  110. 110.

    See Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘BTI 2016-Bangladesh Country Report’, available at https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Bangladesh.pdf.

  111. 111.

    See The Financial Express, ‘Competition Commission still in the works’, available at https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/editorial/competition-commission-still-in-the-works-1507994141.

  112. 112.

    See Section 31 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  113. 113.

    See Section 31(3) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  114. 114.

    See Section 10 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  115. 115.

    See Section 32 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  116. 116.

    See Section 8 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  117. 117.

    See Section 7(4) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  118. 118.

    See Section 29 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  119. 119.

    See Section 29(4) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  120. 120.

    See The Financial Express, ‘Competition Commission to get going next month’, available at http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2016/03/18/21904.

  121. 121.

    See Section 8(3) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  122. 122.

    See Section 24 of the Competition Act, 2012. Also, as the Commission exercises the powers of a civil court, section 8(7) states that, “If any person interferes in the exercise of the power of the Chairperson or any person authorized under sub-section (3) or intentionally fails to comply with the order made under the said sub-section shall be an offence under this Act and such person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 (three) years or fine or with both.”.

  123. 123.

    See Section 25 of the Competition Act, 2012.

  124. 124.

    See Section 8(d) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  125. 125.

    See Sections 8(f)–(h) of the Competition Act, 2012.

  126. 126.

    See The Financial Express, ‘Competition Commission yet to be fully functional’, available at http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2016/06/14/34049/Competition-Commission-yet-to-be-fully-functional.

  127. 127.

    The draft rules have reportedly been framed and are currently awaiting the Bangladesh Governments approval.

  128. 128.

    Political relevance to an extent is important because it prevents the enforcement agency or policy institution from being completely isolated from its external environment, thereby ensuring that it does not become practically ineffectual. However, political relevance should not reinforce political influence or control.

  129. 129.

    See Pakistan, Sect. 2.2.

  130. 130.

    See India, Sect. 2.1.

  131. 131.

    Stages have not been designed to portray the level of advancement of the competition agencies of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. It is a mere simplification derived from the general nature of challenges that the institutions have faced since their inception.

  132. 132.

    For example, the Indian government commissioned a High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law—the Raghavan Committee—to recommend changes to the MRTP Act. See the full report at https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf; Similarly, Pakistan commissioned the World Bank to put forth recommendations, full report available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/875361468283497835/Pakistan-A-framework-for-a-new-competition-policy-and-law.

  133. 133.

    See Pakistan, Sect. 2.2.

  134. 134.

    Ibid.

  135. 135.

    See India, Sect. 2.1.

  136. 136.

    See the Global Competition Review, ‘Rating Enforcement 2017, Pakistan's Competition Commission’, available at https://globalcompetitionreview.com/benchmarking/rating-enforcement-2017/1144843/pakistans-competition-commission.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the editors—Prof. William E. Kovacic, Prof. Yannis Katsoulacos, Prof. Thomas Ross and Prof. Lawrence White—for their detailed and excellent review. We would also like to thank Mr Iqbal Khan Chowdhury (Chairperson, Bangladesh Competition Commission), Mr Ahmed Qadir (Director General, International Affairs, Competition Commission of Pakistan), Mr. Khalid Abu Naser (Member, Bangladesh Competition Commission), Mr Roger Nellist (Independent expert and former head of the DFID Investment, Competition and Enabling Environment team), Ms Amber Darr (Senior fellow, Centre for Law, Economics and Society, University College London), and Dr Raju Parakkal (Associate Professor of International Relations, Jefferson) for their invaluable insights and constructive comments, which helped in improving the paper. This paper does not seek to reflect upon the position or role of current or previous officials of the institutions covered. Any errors or omissions are unintentional and remain the responsibility of the authors. The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Comments and suggestions are welcome via email.

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Correspondence to Ghuman Parveer Singh.

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Ghuman, P.S., Mehta, U.S. Institutional Design of Select Competition Authorities in South Asia: Identifying Challenges and Opportunities. Rev Ind Organ 54, 283–326 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9644-x

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Keywords

  • Competition
  • Antitrust law
  • Competition authority
  • Competition policy
  • South Asia

JEL Classification

  • K21
  • L40
  • L49