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The Chilean Anti-cartel Experience: Accomplishments and Challenges

  • Umut Aydin
  • Nicolás Figueroa
Article
  • 105 Downloads

Abstract

We evaluate the Chilean law and enforcement record in the area of cartels. We identify the high probability of cartel detection, severe sanctions for detected cartels, and the predictability and consistency of enforcement practices as crucial factors that help enforcement agencies maximize the deterrent effect of anti-cartel law and policy. Reforms to the competition law in Chile in 2009 and 2016 have increased the probability of cartel detection by introducing more extensive investigative powers and a leniency program, have made sanctions more severe by increasing monetary fines and introducing prison sentences, and have improved the predictability of the leniency program.

Keywords

Antitrust Cartel Competition policy Chile Regulation Institutions 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Javiera García for excellent research assistance, and Tom Ross and Yannis Katsoulacos and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. This article is the product of research that was originally conducted in the context of Concurso de Políticas Públicas 2016, organized by Centro de Políticas Públicas of Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile, which is supported by the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, the Ministry of Environment, and the Undersecretary of Regional and Administrative Development of Chile. Umut Aydin acknowledges the financial support of FONDECYT Regular No. 1171517. Nicolás Figueroa acknowledges the financial support of Millennium Nucleus Information and Coordination in Networks ICM/FIC RC13000 and the Complex Engineering Systems Institute, ISCI (ICM-FIC: P05-004-F, CONICYT: FB0816).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Instituto de Ciencia PolíticaPontificia Universidad Católica de ChileMacul, SantiagoChile
  2. 2.Instituto de EconomíaPontificia Universidad Católica de ChileMacul, SantiagoChile

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