Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp 435–447 | Cite as

Antidumping Duties and Plant-Level Restructuring

  • Justin R. PierceEmail author


This paper examines the effect of antidumping duties on the restructuring activities of protected plants. Using a dataset that contains the full population of U.S. manufacturers, I find that protected plants increase their capital intensities modestly relative to unprotected plants, but only when antidumping duties have been in place for a sufficient duration. I find little effect of antidumping duties on a proxy for the skilled labor intensity of protected plants.


Antidumping Temporary protection Restructuring 

JEL Classifications

F10 F13 L20 L25 



I thank Bob Feinberg and Larry White for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York (outside the USA)  2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemWashingtonUSA

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