Antidumping Duties and Plant-Level Restructuring
This paper examines the effect of antidumping duties on the restructuring activities of protected plants. Using a dataset that contains the full population of U.S. manufacturers, I find that protected plants increase their capital intensities modestly relative to unprotected plants, but only when antidumping duties have been in place for a sufficient duration. I find little effect of antidumping duties on a proxy for the skilled labor intensity of protected plants.
KeywordsAntidumping Temporary protection Restructuring
JEL ClassificationsF10 F13 L20 L25
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