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Antidumping and Industrial Organization

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Abstract

Although antidumping duties are instruments of trade policy, they are motivated by and have potentially significant impacts on domestic industry interests. The articles in this special issue provide evidence on the effects of antidumping on domestic firms and import patterns; in particular, they stress that these effects are not likely to be uniform across all producers within an industry, and will often depend on how domestic interests respond.

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Notes

  1. Feinberg (1989) had found that dollar appreciation led to fewer antidumping cases filed for an earlier period.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, American University, Washington, DC, 20016-8029, USA

    Robert M. Feinberg

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  1. Robert M. Feinberg
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Correspondence to Robert M. Feinberg.

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Feinberg, R.M. Antidumping and Industrial Organization. Rev Ind Organ 42, 365–368 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9384-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9384-x

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