Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 42, Issue 4, pp 449–481 | Cite as

How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel

  • Chad P. BownEmail author


Use of temporary trade barriers (TTBs) has proliferated across countries, industries, and even policy instruments. We construct a panel of bilateral, product-level US steel imports that are matched to a unique data set on trade policy exclusions that are associated with the 2002 US steel safeguard in order to compare the trade impacts that result from application of various TTB policies over 1989–2003. We find that the trade effects of an applied safeguard—which is statutorily expected to follow the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment—can nevertheless compare closely to the application of the explicitly discriminatory antidumping policy. Our results on trade policy substitutability complement other recent research on these increasingly important forms of import protection.


Safeguards Antidumping Countervailing duties   Temporary trade barriers MFN 

JEL Classification:



  1. Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1990). A theory of managed trade. American Economic Review, 80(4), 779–795.Google Scholar
  3. Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999). An economic theory of GATT. American Economic Review, 89(1), 215–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2011). What do trade negotiators negotiate about? Empirical evidence from the World Trade Organization. American Economic Review, 101(4), 1238–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Blonigen, B. A., Liebman, B. H., Pierce, J. R., & Wilson, W. W. (2013). Are all trade protection policies created equal? empirical evidence for nonequivalent market power effects of tariffs and quotas. Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 369–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Blonigen, B. A., & Wilson, W. W. (2010). Foreign subsidization and excess capacity. Journal of International Economics, 80(2), 200–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Blonigen, B. A., & Prusa, T. J. (2003). Antidumping. In J. Harrigan & E. K. Choi (Eds.), Handbook of international trade (pp. 251–284). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Bown, C. P. (2002). Why are safeguards under the WTO so unpopular? World Trade Review, 1(1), 47–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bown, C. P. (2011). Taking stock of antidumping, safeguards and countervailing duties, 1990–2009. The World Economy, 34(12), 1955–1998.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Bown, C. P. (2012). Temporary trade barriers database. Retrieved December 18, 2012 from World Bank website:
  11. Bown, C. P., & Crowley, M. A. (2005). Safeguards. In P. F. J. Macrory, A. E. Appleton, & M. G. Plummer (Eds.), The World Trade Organization: Legal, economic and political analysis (pp. 43–66). New York: Springer.Google Scholar
  12. Bown, C. P., & Crowley, M. A. (2007). Trade deflection and trade depression. Journal of International Economics, 72(1), 176–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Bown, C. P., & Crowley, M. A. (2011). Import protection, business cycles, and exchange rates: evidence from the Great Recession. Journal of International Economics. (in press).Google Scholar
  14. Bown, C. P., & Crowley, M. A. (2013). Self-enforcing trade agreements: evidence from time-varying trade policy. American Economic Review, 103(2), 1071–1090Google Scholar
  15. Broda, C., Limão, N., & Weinstein, D. E. (2008). Optimal tariffs and market power: The evidence. American Economic Review, 98(5), 2032–2065.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Davis, S. J., & Haltiwanger, J. (1992). Gross job creation, gross job destruction, and employment reallocation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 819–863.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Durling, J. P., & Prusa, T. J. (2003). Using safeguard protection to raise domestic rivals’ cost. Japan and the World Economy, 15(1), 47–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Durling, J. P., & Prusa, T. J. (2006). The trade effects associated with an antidumping epidemic: The hot-rolled steel market, 1996–2001. European Journal of Political Economy, 22(3), 675–695.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Johnson, H. G. (1953–4). Optimum tariffs and retaliation. Review of Economic Studies, 21(2), 142–53.Google Scholar
  20. Konings, J., Vandenbussche, H., & Springael, L. (2001). Import diversion under European antidumping policy. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 1(3), 283–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Krishna, P. (2004). The economics of preferential trade agreements. In E. K. Choi & J. Hartigan (Eds.), Handbook of international trade (Vol. II, pp. 294–312). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
  22. Liebman, B., & Tomlin, K. M. (2007). Steel safeguards and the welfare of U.S. steel firms and downstream consumers of steel: A shareholder wealth perspective. Canadian Journal of Economics, 40(3), 812–842.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Liebman, B., & Tomlin, K. M. (2008). Safeguards and retaliatory threats. Journal of Law and Economics, 51(2), 276–351.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Miranda, J., Torres, R. A., & Ruiz, M. (1998). The international use of antidumping: 1987–1997. Journal of World Trade, 32(5), 5–71.Google Scholar
  25. Prusa, T. J. (1997). The trade effects of U.S. antidumping actions. In R. C. Feenstra (Ed.), Effects of U.S. trade protection and promotion policies (pp. 191–213). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  26. Prusa, T. J. (2001). On the spread and impact of anti-dumping. Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(3), 591–611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Rosegrant, S. (2002). Standing up for steel: The US government response to steel industry and union efforts to win protection from imports (1998–2001). Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University.Google Scholar
  28. Staiger, R. W., & Wolak, F. A. (1994). Measuring industry-specific protection: antidumping in the United States (pp. 51–118). Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 51–118.Google Scholar
  29. USTR (2004a). “Information on product exclusion requests under Section 203”. Retrieved March 28, 2004 from USTR website,
  30. USTR (2004b). “President Bush Takes Action on Steel”. Retrieved February 29, 2004 from USTR website:
  31. Viner, J. (1950). The customs union issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Development Research Group, Trade and International Integration (DECTI)The World BankWashingtonUSA

Personalised recommendations