Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 42, Issue 2, pp 203–230 | Cite as

Telecommunication in the US: From Regulation to Competition (Almost)

Article

Abstract

Alfred E. Kahn was an observer and practitioner of telecommunications regulation as technology changed the industry from a natural monopoly to a platform-based oligopoly among telephone, cable, satellite, and wireless carriers. Regulation and legislation were slow to recognize these changes, and large welfare losses occurred, some of which could have been avoided if regulators, legislators and economists had followed Fred’s economic advice: Prices must be informed by costs; the relevant costs are actual incremental costs; costs and prices are an outcome of a Schumpeterian competitive process, not the starting point; excluding firms from markets is fundamentally anticompetitive; a reliance on imperfect markets subject to antitrust law is preferable to necessarily imperfect regulation; and a regulatory transition to deregulation entails propensities to micromanage the process to generate preferred outcomes, visible competitors, and expedient price reductions.

Keywords

Competition Deregulation Kahn Regulation Telecommunications 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.MIT Department of EconomicsMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.National Economic Research Associates, Inc.BostonUSA

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