Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 42, Issue 3, pp 321–343 | Cite as

The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs

  • Dakshina G. De Silva
  • Georgia KosmopoulouEmail author
  • Beatrice Pagel
  • Ronald Peeters


We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts that are known to have primarily private costs. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique that was proposed by Racine and Li (J Econom 119(1):99–130, 2004) we find that bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats that are related to synergies and the level of bidder participation.


Multi-unit auctions Procurement auctions 

JEL Classification

D44 H57 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dakshina G. De Silva
    • 1
  • Georgia Kosmopoulou
    • 2
    Email author
  • Beatrice Pagel
    • 3
  • Ronald Peeters
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsLancaster UniversityLancasterUK
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of OklahomaNormanUSA
  3. 3.Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)DüsseldorfGermany
  4. 4.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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