Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 38, Issue 4, pp 387–404 | Cite as

Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel



Antitrust enforcement efforts in the United States and abroad have been ramped up in high-tech industries, which has rekindled older and largely unresolved debates concerning the appropriate role of antitrust enforcement in high-tech markets. This paper evaluates the likely competitive effects of Intel’s conduct through two approaches: The conventional approach focuses on traditional antitrust metrics in product markets: prices and output. The second, alternative approach involves turning to financial markets for valuable information. Under either approach, the available data do not support the theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers.


AMD Antitrust Federal Trade Commission Loyalty discounts Monopolization Intel Stock price evidence Technology 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason University School of LawArlingtonUSA

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