Skip to main content
Log in

The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity

  • Published:
Review of Industrial Organization Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

While there has been a considerable literature exploring the determinants of antitrust enforcement in the United States, these studies have been based either on aggregate federal enforcement data over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a single year or aggregated over several years. What has never been investigated is the pattern of state-level antitrust litigation. This is somewhat surprising, as this has been a major activity of many state attorneys general. In this paper, we explain state antitrust activity across states, examining a number of the economic and political determinants that have been proposed in the literature.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Antitrust Committee of the Section on Commercial and Federal Litigation, New York State Bar Association. Commercial (2003) Committee report: The state of state antitrust enforcement. NYSBA NY Litigator 8(1): 4–10

    Google Scholar 

  • Areeda P. A., Baxter W., Reasoner H. (1994) Antitrust policy. In: Feldstein M. (eds) American economic policy in the 1980’s. University of Chicago, Chicago, pp 573–626

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker G. (1968) Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Besanko D., Spulber D. F. (1989) Antitrust enforcement under asymmetric information. The Economic Journal 99: 408–425

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block M. K., Nold F. C., Sidak J. G. (1981) The deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement. Journal of Political Economy 89(3): 429–445

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeBow M. (2004) State antitrust enforcement: Empirical evidence and a modest reform proposal. In: Epstein R., Greve M. (eds) Competition laws in conflict: Antitrust jurisdiction in the global economy. AEI Press, Washington, DC, pp 267–287

    Google Scholar 

  • Elzinga K. G., Breit W. (1976) The antitrust penalties: A study in law and economics. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Feinberg R. M. (1980) Antitrust enforcement and subsequent price behavior. Review of Economics and Statistics 62(4): 609–612

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghosal V., Gallo J. (2001) The cyclical behavior of the department of justice’s antitrust enforcement activity. International Journal of Industrial Organization 19: 27–54

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghosal V., Harrington J. E., Stennek J. (2007) Issues in antitrust enforcement. In: Ghosal V., Stennek J. (eds) The political economy of antitrust. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1–23

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrington J. E. (2004) Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority. RAND Journal of Economics 35(4): 651–673

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hirsch B. T., Macpherson D. A. (2003) Union membership and coverage database from the current population survey: Note. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56(2): 349–354

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lee L. W. (1980) Some models of antitrust enforcement. Southern Economic Journal 47(1): 147–155

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Long W. F., Schramm R., Tollision R. (1973) The economic determinants of antitrust activity. Journal of Law and Economics 16(2): 351–364

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masson, R. T., & Reynolds, R. J. (1977). Statistical studies of antitrust enforcement: A critique. In American statistical association proceedings, business and economic statistics section part I.

  • Peltzman S. (1976) Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19(2): 211–240

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pittman R. (1992) Antitrust and the political process. In: Audretsch D. B., Siegfried J. J. (eds) Empirical studies in industrial organization: Essays in honor of leonard W. Weiss. Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, pp 147–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest G. L., Klein B. (1984) The selection of disputes for litigation. Journal of Legal Studies 13: 1–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose J. (1994) State antitrust enforcement, mergers, and politics. Wayne Law Review 41: 71

    Google Scholar 

  • Salop S. C., White L. J. (1988) Private antitrust litigation: An introduction and framework. In: White L. J. (eds) Private antitrust litigation: New evidence, new learning. MIT Press, Boston, pp 3–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Siegfried J. J. (1975) The determinants of antitrust activity. Journal of Law and Economics 18: 559–574

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White L. J. (1988) Litigation and economic incentives. Research in Law and Economics 11: 73–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Wood B. D., Anderson J. E. (1993) The politics of US antitrust regulation. American Journal of Political Science 37(1): 1–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Robert M. Feinberg.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Feinberg, R.M., Reynolds, K.M. The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity. Rev Ind Organ 37, 179–196 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9264-6

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9264-6

Keywords

Navigation