Abstract
This paper investigates the exercise of market power by a large buyer who emerges via growth, merger, or group purchasing. It explores the efficiency and redistributive effects of such an event when a competitive fringe of small buyers remains in the market. Terms of trade, including those for small buyers, depend on structural conditions on the supply side of the market and the nature of interactions between the newly emerged dominant buyer and suppliers. Predicted aggregate welfare effects have implications for antitrust.
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Mills, D.E. Buyer Power and Industry Structure. Rev Ind Organ 36, 213–225 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9244-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9244-x