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Antitrust Update: DG Competition 2007–2008

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Abstract

This article discusses some significant developments in the enforcement activities of the Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission, during 2007–2008, focusing on two main themes: non-horizontal mergers and two-sided markets.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chief Economist Team, DG Competition, European Commission, Rue Joseph II/Jozef II-straat 70, 1000, Brussels, Belgium

    Damien Neven & Svend Albæk

Authors
  1. Damien Neven
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  2. Svend Albæk
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Correspondence to Svend Albæk.

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Neven, D., Albæk, S. Antitrust Update: DG Competition 2007–2008. Rev Ind Organ 33, 231–246 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9186-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9186-8

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