Abstract
We analyze licensing contracts specifying an exclusive territory clause and a fixed fee as a form of payment. While commonly observed, the effects of such licensing contracts have not been investigated in the licensing literature. We find that they can generate revenues for an innovator equal to those that would be obtained by a monopolist using the cost-reducing innovation that is being licensed. This result, however, depends on three factors: The size of the market relative to the pre-innovation marginal cost, the quality of the innovation, and the degree of substitutability between the goods being produced in the market.
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Erutku, C., Priegue Freire, A. & Richelle, Y. Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts. Rev Ind Organ 31, 261–273 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9158-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-008-9158-z