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Simple money-based tests for choosing between private and public delivery: a discussion of the issues

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Abstract

The decision when to provide services by the public sector and when to use the private sector is a fundamental one. The economic literature emphasises that the efficiency of the mechanisms of delivery will depend on the contractual nature of what can be achieved by the parties and the political economy forces. Totally separate from this literature, however, governments have tried to implement practical and simple tests to indicate when to use private and when to use public delivery methods. The aim of this paper is to address some of the issues associated with simple money-based tests.

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Grout, P.A., Sonderegger, S. Simple money-based tests for choosing between private and public delivery: a discussion of the issues. Rev Ind Organ 29, 93–126 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9111-y

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