Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of merger enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission under the 1992 Merger Guidelines. The econometric analysis suggests that enforcement decisions are best predicted with the Herfindahl index when the relevant theory is collusion and the number of significant rivals when the relevant theory is unilateral effects. Evidence such as “hot” documents, customer complaints, and historical events suggestive of past competitive problems also increase the chance of a challenge. Mirror image considerations suggestive of continued post-merger competition (“cold” documents, customer support, and procompetitive events) reduce the probability of challenge in one specification.
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References
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This article is based on non-public data obtained from Federal Trade Commission internal files. The Commission’s General Counsel has authorized publication of such data in aggregated form under Commission Rule 4.11(g), 16 C.F.R. 4.11(g). I would like to thank David Scheffman, Paul Pautler, Elizabeth Callison, and Jeffrey Fischer for helpful comments on the project and Anthony Alcorn, Brian Cross, Fulvio Cajina, Paul Golaszewski, Wendy Hanson, Janet Ireland, Karl Kindler, Michael Madigan, Madeleine McChesney, Joseph Remy, and especially Matthew Tschetter for research assistance in assembling the data. Of course, the analyses and conclusions set forth in this paper remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission, any individual Commissioner, or any Commission Bureau.
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Coate, M.B. Empirical Analysis of Merger Enforcement Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines. Rev Ind Organ 27, 279–301 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-005-5712-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-005-5712-0