Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 147–167 | Cite as

Detecting Collusion

  • Robert H. PorterEmail author


Detection and deterrence of collusion are longstanding antitrust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements are usually surreptitious. In this paper, I discuss factors that facilitate or inhibit collusive schemes, as well as circumstances where detection is possible. I describe how industrial organization economists diagnose collusion (both explicit and tacit) among firms.


Industrial Organization Organization Economist Collusive Scheme Industrial Organization Economist Detect Collusion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics Northwestern UniversityEvanstonU.S.A.

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