Less money after divorce – how the 2008 alimony reform in Germany affected spouses’ labor supply, leisure and marital stability

Table 12 Results of robustness test with singles’ control group

	OLS			FE
	Labor force participation	Actual working hours per weekday	Leisure (hours per weekday)	Labor force participation	Actual working hours per weekday	Leisure (hours per weekday)
	Coef./StdE	Coef./StdE	Coef./StdE	Coef./StdE	Coef./StdE	Coef./StdE
PANEL A: WOMEN
Treatment group	0.0029 (0.0232)	−0.0730 (0.2187)	−0.0720 (0.1169)	–	–	–
Post-reform × treatment group	0.0010 (0.0257)	−0.1496 (0.2071)	0.0614 (0.1013)	0.0081 (0.0291)	−0.0636 (0.1968)	0.0807 (0.1138)
Adjusted R²	0.19	0.12	0.07	0.16	0.14	0.03
Observations	7557	4999	7557	7557	4999	7557
PANEL B: MEN
Treatment group	0.0219 (0.0152)	0.0475 (0.1452)	−0.2557* (0.1342)	–	–	–
Post-reform × treatment group	−0.0247 (0.0166)	−0.2069 (0.1313)	0.0558 (0.1357)	0.0025 (0.0155)	−0.2306** (0.1118)	0.0464 (0.1689)
Adjusted R²	0.10	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.03
Observations	8794	6295	8794	8794	6295	8794

Notes: OLS and FE regression results with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Asterisks indicate p values according to: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The post-reform dummy equals one in the years 2008–2010, and zero in the years 2005–2007. The treatment group includes persons who got married for the first time in the pre-reform period, and who have been cohabiting with their spouse at some point in this period. The control group includes persons who did not get married until at least 2007 and were single (i.e. not cohabiting with a partner) in 2007. Control variables are the same as in Tables 2 and 3