Abstract.
Many recently policy proposals are intended to alter the incentives to establish or terminate family relationships, often with the goal of encouraging marriage. This paper develops a model of family structure decisions and uses it to argue that some such reforms may actually have the opposite effect. A pro-marriage reform raises both the value of marrying one’s current partner and the value of search. When the latter effect dominates, singles are less likely to form a match, and couples are more likely to separate and optimally make fewer commitments to their relationships.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
James W. Albrecht Bo Axell (1984) ArticleTitle‘‘An Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment’‘ Journal of Political Economy 92 824–840
Gary S. Becker (1973) ArticleTitle‘‘A Theory of Marriage: Part 1’‘ Journal of Political Economy 81 813–846
David. Blackwell (1965) ArticleTitle‘‘Discounted Dynamic Programming’‘ Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36 226–235
Martin Browning François Bourguignon Pierre-André Chiappori Valérie Lechene (1994) ArticleTitle‘‘Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation’‘ Journal of Political Economy 102 1067–1096
Center for Arizona Policy. (2001). ‘‘Covenant Marriage Update’’, Arizona Citizen March 2001, 2.
Daley, Suzanne. (2000). ‘‘Law Lets French couples Say ‘I Do,’ To a Degree’’, New York Times April 18, 2000, Online Edition.
DeMillo, Andrew. (2002). ‘‘Covenant Marriages Slow to Take Off: 57 Couples File for Pact that Requires Counseling, 2-year Divorce Wait’’, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette August 26, 2002, B3.
Scott D. Drewianka (2003) ArticleTitle‘‘Estimating Social Effects in Matching Markets: Externalities in Spousal Search” Review of Economics and Statistics 85 409–423
William C. Duncan (2001) ArticleTitle‘‘Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique” Brigham Young University Law Review 2001 961–992
Patrick. Festy (2001) ArticleTitle‘‘The ‘Civil Solidarity Pact’ (PACS) in France: An Impossible Evaluation” Population and Sociétés 369 1–4
Claudia Goldin Lawrence F. Katz (2002) ArticleTitle‘‘The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions” Journal of Political Economy 60 730–770
Amyra. Grossbard-Shechtman (1982) ArticleTitle‘‘A Theory of Marriage Formality: The Case of Guatemala” Economic Development and Cultural Change 30 813–830
Amyra. Grossbard-Shechtman (1985) ‘‘Marriage Squeezes and the Marriage Market” Kingsley Davis (Eds) Contemporary Marriage: Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Institution Russell Sage Foundation New York
Shoshana. Grossbard-Shechtman (1993) On the Economics of Marriage: A Theory of Marriage, Labor, and Divorce Westview Press Boulder, CO
Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana, Olivia Ekert-Jaffe, and Bertrand Lemennicier. (2002). ‘‘Property Division at Divorce and Demographic Behavior: An Economic Analysis and International Comparison”, Paper presented at the American Economics Association Meetings, Atlanta, GA.
Gruber, Jonathan. (2000). ‘‘Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce”, NBER Working Paper Series 7968.
INSEE. (2003). ‘‘The French Population in 2002: Slight downturn in births,” Website: www.insee.fr/en/ffc/pop_age4.htm.
Boyan. Jovanovic (1979) ArticleTitle‘‘Firm-specific Capital and Turnover” Journal of Political Economy 87 1246–1260
Keeley, Michael C. (1974). ‘‘A Model of Marital Formation: The Determinants of the Optimal Age at First Marriage”, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago.
Margaret. Mead (1970) ‘‘Marriage in Two Steps’‘ Herbert A. Otto (Eds) The Family in Search of a Future Appleton-Century-Crofts New York
Dale. Mortensen (1986) ‘‘Job Search and Labor Market Analysis’‘ Orley C. Ashenfelter Richard Layard (Eds) Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 2 Elsevier Science Amsterdam
Dale T. Mortensen Christopher A. Pissarides (1999) ‘‘New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor Market” Orley C. Ashenfelter David Card (Eds) Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B Elsevier Science Amsterdam
Theodora. Ooms (2001) ArticleTitle‘‘The Role of the Federal Government in Strengthening Marriage” Virginia Journal of Social Policy the Law 9 163–191
Parke, Mary, and Theodora Ooms. (2002). ‘‘More than a Dating Service? State Activities Designed to Strengthen and Promote Marriage”, Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) Policy Brief, Couples and Marriage Series, Brief Number 2.
Sanchez, Laura, Steven L. Nock, James D. Wright, and Julia L. Wilson. (2002). ‘‘Social and Demographic Factors Associated with Couples’ Choice between Covenant and Standard Marriage in Louisiana”, Paper presented at the 2002 Annual Meetings of the Population Association of America.
Yoram Weiss Robert J. Willis (1985) ArticleTitle‘‘Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements” Journal of Labor Economics 3 268–292
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This paper has benefitted from conversations with Gary Becker, Robert Michael, Victor Lima, Janice Compton, Emek Basker, Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman (the editor), several anonymous referees, and the participants of workshops at the University of Chicago and the Midwest Economics Association. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the University of Chicago and the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development (Grant number T32HD07302). Any remaining deficiencies are solely my responsibility.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Drewianka, S. How Will Reforms of Marital Institutions Influence Marital Commitment? A Theoretical Analysis. Rev Econ Household 2, 303–323 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-004-5649-3
Received:
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-004-5649-3