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Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 53, Issue 1, pp 20–36 | Cite as

Trading service quality for safety: a cautionary tale from the French ‘Robien law’ on elevator safety

  • Lisa Chever
  • Michael Klien
Original Article

Abstract

To deal with elevator accidents the French ‘Robien law’ mandated safety upgrades for ‘old’ elevators. Available statistics suggest that the law reduced fatal accidents but also coincides with an unprecedented deterioration in service quality, multiplying breakdowns and downtime. We exploit a unique data set of more than 3500 elevators over 10 years to investigate the law’s impact. Using a difference-in-difference setting, our results indicate that the law led to a considerable increase in the number of failures and downtime. We also find evidence that the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the higher failure rates were not met by a sufficient increase in maintenance staff.

Keywords

Safety regulation Side effect Quality Elevators 

JEL Classification

K32 R41 L50 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sorbonne Business School/Chaire EPPPParisFrance
  2. 2.Austrian Institute of Economic ResearchWienAustria

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