Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 50, Issue 1, pp 99–110 | Cite as

Weak versus strong net neutrality: correction and clarification

Original Article

Abstract

We correct and clarify the results of Gans (J Regul Econ 47:183–200, 2015) regarding the effects of net neutrality regulation on equilibrium outcomes in settings where a content provider sells its services to consumers for a fee. We examine both pricing and investment effects. We extend the earlier paper’s result that weak forms of net neutrality are ineffective and also show that even a strong form of net neutrality may be ineffective. In addition, we demonstrate that, when strong net neutrality does affect the equilibrium outcome, it may harm efficiency by distorting both ISP and content provider investment and service-quality choices.

Keywords

Regulation Net neutrality Internet service providers Content providers Infrastructure investment 

JEL Classification

L1 D4 L12 L13 C63 D42 D43 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rotman School of ManagementUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada
  2. 2.NBERCambridgeUSA
  3. 3.Haas School of BusinessBerkeleyUSA

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