Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, which allows a new mobile network operator to set higher termination rates than the incumbent operator. We assume that there are two market segments: one in which operators compete on equal terms, with a new technology, and the other in which the entrant is at a disadvantage since the technology it offers is inferior to the incumbent’s. Results show that asymmetric regulation can create favorable conditions that allow the entrant to strengthen its market positioning, and enhance consumer net utilities and social welfare. This highlights the importance of the degree of network asymmetry and the ways in which consumers are split between the two market segments. Lastly, we show that asymmetric regulation can create greater investment incentives for the entrant which could effectively enhance social welfare. These findings can provide useful insights for regulatory policy.
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Baranes, E., Vuong, C.H. Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges. J Regul Econ 42, 204–222 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9171-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-011-9171-2