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Impact of government-sponsored pollution prevention practices on environmental compliance and enforcement: evidence from a sample of US manufacturing facilities

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Abstract

A two-way fixed effects Poisson model is used to investigate the impact of 43 EPA-sponsored pollution prevention (P2) practices on compliance and enforcement for a sample of facilities in the US manufacturing sector. I find that P2 adoption reduces environmental violations in three industries while increasing violations in two others. P2 adoption also spurs fewer enforcement actions in three industries. I further partition the P2 practices into three categories based on their approach to improve environmental performance. In doing so, I find that practices that involve changes in operating procedures—about a third of adopted P2 practices—such as instituting a self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources, improving maintenance scheduling and/or labeling procedures, are effective in reducing violations while practices that involve equipment or material changes are not. I also find that adopters of practices that require changes in either procedures or manufacturing equipment—about half of adopted practices—are rewarded with a more cooperative treatment of environmental infractions with fewer enforcement actions.

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  1. Department of Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics, The Ohio State University, Agricultural Administration Building # 238, 2120 Fyffe Rd, Columbus, OH, 43210, USA

    Abdoul G. Sam

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  1. Abdoul G. Sam
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Sam, A.G. Impact of government-sponsored pollution prevention practices on environmental compliance and enforcement: evidence from a sample of US manufacturing facilities. J Regul Econ 37, 266–286 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-009-9103-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-009-9103-6

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