Abstract
In its review of the Cingular/AT&T Wireless merger, the FCC noted the potentially conflicting incentives of wireline-affiliated (vertically integrated) versus independent (non-integrated) wireless carriers to act as intermodal competitors in the wireline exchange access market. Specifically, because Cingular and Verizon Wireless are owned by wireline carriers, they may have an incentive to compete “less aggressively” within their parents’ wireline territories while AT&T Wireless, an independent wireless carrier, would not. This paper examines these and other hypotheses by examining pre-merger data on the wireless plans offered by the three carriers. The empirical analysis suggests that AT&T Wireless did not design its plans based upon a regional strategy, whereas Cingular offered substantially smaller-minute wireless plans within its parents’ wireline territories. However, the results also suggest that Verizon Wireless did not design its plans in a markedly different fashion within and outside of its parent’s wireline region. It is posited that these findings might reflect the differing ownership and control structures of Cingular and Verizon Wireless.
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Zimmerman, P.R. Strategic incentives under vertical integration: the case of wireline-affiliated wireless carriers and intermodal competition in the US. J Regul Econ 34, 282–298 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-008-9065-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-008-9065-0
Keywords
- Business cannibalization
- Intermodal competition
- Telecommunications
- Vertical integration
- Wireless telephony