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Pricing access in network competition

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Abstract

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of North Dakota, Stop 8369, Grand Forks, ND, 58202, USA

    Sue H. Mialon

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  1. Sue H. Mialon
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Correspondence to Sue H. Mialon.

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Mialon, S.H. Pricing access in network competition. J Regul Econ 31, 109–123 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-9009-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-9009-5

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