Akbas, F., Meschke, F., & Wintoki, M. (2016). Director networks and informed traders. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 62(1), 1–23.
Arthaud-Day, M., Certo, S., Dalton, C., & Dalton, D. (2006). A changing of the guard: Executive and director turnover following corporate financial restatements. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1119–1136.
Bartov, E. (1993). The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review, 68(4), 840–855.
Barua, A., Lin, S., & Sbaraglia, A. (2010). Earnings management using discontinued operations. The Accounting Review, 85(5), 1485–1509.
Bazerman, M., & Schoorman, F. (1983). A limited rationality model of interlocking directorates. Academy of Management Review, 8(2), 206–217.
Beasley, M., Carcello, J., Hermanson, D., & Neal, T. (2009). The audit committee oversight process. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(1), 65–122.
Bebchuk, L., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2), 409–433.
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009). What matters in corporate governance? Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 783–827.
Bhojraj, S., Sengupta, P., & Zhang, S. (2017). Restructuring charges, FAS 146, and the accrual anomaly. Management Science, 63(1), 3654–3671.
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., & Whitby, R. (2009). Option backdating and board interlocks. Review of Financial Studies, 22(11), 4821–4847.
Bowen, R., Davis, A., & Matsumoto, D. (2005). Emphasis on pro forma versus GAAP earnings in quarterly press releases: Determinants, SEC intervention, and market reactions. The Accounting Review, 80(4), 1011–1038.
Bradshaw, M., & Sloan, R. (2002). GAAP versus the street: An empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 41–66.
Brown, J., & Drake, K. (2014). Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review, 89(2), 483–510.
Burgstahler, D., Jiambalvo, J., & Shevlin, T. (2002). Do stock prices fully reflect the implications of special items for future earnings? Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), 585–612.
Burt, R. (1980). Cooptive corporate actor networks: A reconsideration of interlocking directorates involving American manufacturing. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(4), 557–582.
Cai, Y., & Sevilir, M. (2012). Board connections and M&A transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2), 327–349.
Cai, Y., Dhaliwal, D., Kim, Y., & Pan, C. (2014). Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(3), 1086–1119.
Chiu, P., Teoh, S. H., & Tian, F. (2013). Board interlock and earnings management contagion. The Accounting Review, 88(3), 915–944.
Cready, W., Lopez, T., & Sisneros, C. (2010). The persistence and market valuation of recurring special items. The Accounting Review, 85(5), 1577–1615.
Cready, W., Lopez, T., & Sisneros, C. (2012). Negative special items and future earnings: Expense transfer or real improvements? The Accounting Review, 87(4), 1165–1195.
Curtis, A., McVay, S., & Wolfe, M. (2014). An analysis of the implications of discontinued operations for continuing income. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 33(2), 190–201.
Daily, C. (1996). Governance pattern in bankruptcy reorganizations. Strategic Management Journal, 17(5), 355–375.
Davis, G. (1991). Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(4), 583–613.
Davis, G., & Greve, H. (1997). Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s. American Journal of Sociology, 103(1), 1–37.
Dechow, P., & Ge, W. (2006). The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2–3), 253–296.
DeZoort, F. (1998). An analysis of experience effects on audit committee members’ oversight judgments. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 23(1), 1–22.
DeZoort, F., & Salterio, S. (2001). The effects of corporate governance experience, and financial reporting and audit knowledge, on audit committee member judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 20(1), 31–47.
Dopuch, N., & Pincus, M. (1988). Evidence on the choice of inventory accounting methods: LIFO versus FIFO. Journal of Accounting Research, 26(1), 28–59.
Doyle, J., Lundholm, R., & Soliman, M. (2003). The predictive value of expenses excludes from pro forma earnings. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(2–3), 145–174.
El-Khatib, R., Fogel, K., & Jandik, T. (2015). CEO network centrality and merger performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 116(2), 349–382.
Elliott, J., & Hanna, J. (1996). Repeated accounting write-offs and the information content of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 34(Supplement), 135–155.
Elliott, J., & Shaw, W. (1988). Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions. Journal of Accounting Research, 26(Supplement), 91–119.
Fan, Y., Barua, A., Cready, W., & Thomas, W. (2010). Managing earnings using classification shifting: Evidence from quarterly special items. The Accounting Review, 85(4), 1303–1323.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). (1994). Emerging Issues Task Fork (EIFT) No. 94-3, Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit an Activity (including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring). Norwalk: FASB Emerging Issues Task Force.
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). (2002). Statement of financial accounting standards no. 146, accounting for costs associated with exit or disposal activities. Norwalk: FASB.
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D., & Cannella, A., Jr. (2009). Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams and boards. New York: Oxford University Press.
Francis, J., Hanna, D., & Vincent, L. (1996). Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs. Journal of Accounting Research, 34(Supplement), 117–134.
Hallock, K. (1997). Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32(33), 1–344.
Han, J., Hu, N., Liu, L., & Tian, G. (2017). Does director interlock impact the diffusion of accounting method choice? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 36(4), 316–344.
Haunschild, P. (1993). Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 564–592.
Haverman, H. (1993). Follow the leader mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 593–627.
Healy, P., Kang, S., & Palepu, K. (1987). The effect of accounting procedure changes on CEOs’ cash salary and bonus compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 9(1), 7–34.
Hermann, D., Inoue, T., & Thomas, W. (2002). The sales of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1), 89–108.
Hirshleifer, D., & Teoh, S. H. (2003). Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), 337–386.
Holthausen, R. (1981). Evidence on the effect of bond covenants and management compensation contracts on the choice of accounting techniques: The case of the depreciation switch-back. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5(1), 77–117.
Johnson, P., Lopez, T., & Sanchez, J. (2011). Special items: A descriptive analysis. Accounting Horizons, 25(3), 511–536.
Jones, D., & Smith, K. (2011). Comparing the value relevance, predictive value, and persistence of other comprehensive income and special items. The Accounting Review, 86(6), 2047–2073.
Kang, E., & Tan, B. (2008). Accounting choices and director interlocks: A social network approach to the voluntary expensing stock option grants. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35(9–10), 1079–1102.
Keating, A., & Zimmerman, J. (2000). Depreciation-policy changes: Tax, earnings management, and investment opportunity incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28(3), 359–389.
Kedia, S., Koh, K., & Rajpopal, S. (2015). Evidence on the contagion of earnings management. The Accounting Review, 90(6), 2337–2373.
Keinath, A., & Walo, J. (2004). Audit committee responsibilities. The CPA Journal. http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1104/essentials/p22.htm
Kinney, M., & Trezevant, R. (1997). The use of special items to manage earnings and perceptions. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis, 3(1), 45–54.
Knapp, M. (1987). An empirical study of audit committee support for auditors involved in technical dispute with client management. The Accounting Review, 62(3), 578–588.
Larcker, D., So, E., & Wang, C. (2013). Board centrality and firm performance. Journal Accounting and Economics, 55(2–3), 225–250.
Lee, Y. (2014). An examination of restructuring charges surrounding the implementation of SFAS 146. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(2), 539–572.
Lennox, C., & Yu, J. (2016). The role of director and executive interlocks in mitigating uncertainty in auditor hiring decisions (Working paper). University of Southern California and University of Virginia.
Linck, J., Netter, J., & Yang, T. (2009). Effects and unintended consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate boards. Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 3287–3328.
McVay, S. (2006). Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core earnings and special items. The Accounting Review, 81(1), 501–531.
Mizruchi, M. (1989). Similarity of political behavior among large American corporations. American Journal of Sociology, 95(2), 401–424.
Moehrle, S. (2002). Do firms use restructuring charge reversals to meet earnings targets? The Accounting Review, 77(2), 397–413.
Peterson, C., & Philpot, J. (2007). Women’s roles on U.S. fortune 500 boards: Director expertise and committee memberships. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(2), 177–196.
Prasad, V., & Jena, A. (2013). Prespecified falsification end points: Can they validate true observational associations? Journal of American Medical Association, 309(3), 241–242.
Ravina, E., & Sapienza, P. (2010). What do independent directors know? Evidence from their trading. Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 962–1003.
Reppenhagen, D. (2010). Contagion of accounting methods: Evidence from stock option expensing. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(3), 629–657.
Richardson, S., Tuna, A., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Accounting for taste: Board member preferences and corporate policy choices (Working paper). University of Pennsylvania and MIT.
Riedl, E., & Srinivasan, S. (2010). Signaling firm performance through financial statement presentation: An analysis using special items. Contemporary Accounting Research, 21(1), 289–332.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2003). Release no. 33–8220, standards relating to listed company audit committees. Washington, DC: SEC.
Shropshire, C. (2010). The role of the interlocking director and broad receptivity in the diffusion of practices. Academy of Management Review, 35(2), 246–264.
Strong, J., & Meyer, J. (1987). Asset writedowns: Managerial incentives and security returns. Journal of Finance, 42(3), 643–661.
Stuart, T., & Yim, S. (2010). Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions. Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1), 174–189.
Wooldridge, J. (2013). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach (5th ed.). Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning.
Yerak, B. (2012). Staggered boards: Public companies’ directors the centerpiece of a tug of war. Chicago Tribune, April 4. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-04/business/ct-biz-0401-bf-staggered-boards-20120401_1_board-structure-board-members-board-terms