Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Employee mobility, noncompete agreements, product-market competition, and company disclosure

  • Published:
Review of Accounting Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study explores the impact on companies’ disclosures of U.S. states’ different propensities to enforce noncompete agreements. I find a negative association between a state’s enforcement of noncompete agreements and disclosure activities of firms headquartered in that state. Companies that face local rivals drive some results. Analyses that focus on several state-level changes in enforcement level of noncompete agreements confirm this association. Overall, the findings are consistent with a higher enforcement of noncompete agreements increasing proprietary costs of disclosure, because companies in high-enforcement settings are less informed about each other due to reduced information leakage from employee transfers across competitors. The results suggest that the overall environment for information spillovers surrounding a firm impacts its degree of disclosure to the capital markets and that state-specific enforcement of noncompete agreements can be used as a novel measure of the proprietary costs of disclosure.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Starr et al. (2017) find that 18% of employees in the labor force in 2014 are working under a noncompete agreement, and that 38% of employees sign a noncompete agreement at some point in their life. The proportions are much higher for employees working in high-skill, high paying jobs that involve trade secrets. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that noncompete agreements are not restricted to top executives. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, “Once largely aimed at top executives, noncompetes are ‘reaching wider and deeper within organizations’ to include sales representatives, engineers and people involved in research and innovation, says Paul Greco, counsel at the law firm Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney” (Simon and Loten 2013).

  2. Survey results are available at http://www.shrm.org/Pages/default.aspx.

  3. This variable is based on a detailed analysis of individual states’ regulations on noncompete agreements, and has been gaining traction in industrial organization, finance, and accounting literatures (e.g., Samila and Sorenson 2011; Acharya et al. 2014; Belenzon and Schankerman 2013; Aobdia 2015; Ertimur et al. 2017).

  4. It is unclear which jurisdiction applies when employees transfer from one state to another. Some states have voided noncompete agreements issued in other states (Kahn 1999). The scope of noncompete agreements is also often restricted to the state where they are issued.

  5. Garmaise (2011) and Aobdia (2015), in different settings, also focus on enforcement changes in the state of Texas.

  6. These results usually contrast with theoretical literature that addresses disclosure in the context of an entrant and an incumbent. Several papers show that proprietary costs, in the context of an entry game, can lead to an outcome equivalent to full disclosure (Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Wagenhofer 1990). In this paper, my focus is on within-industry competition and not on the threat of entry.

  7. Clinch and Verrecchia (1997), in the context of a Cournot duopoly, endogenize the proprietary costs of disclosure and find that the disclosure interval is reduced when the intensity of competition increases. However, in contrast to Verrecchia (1983), they find that the nondisclosure region applies for very high and very low demand.

  8. In a related study, Li et al. (2017) finds a lower level of disclosure in states that adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine.

  9. This is evidenced by extensive interactions between former colleagues at competing firms in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994; Gilson 1999; Hyde 2011).

  10. Starr et al. (2017) also report that the vast majority of employees do not negotiate the terms of noncompete agreements.

  11. Firms could have additional locations in states where the level of enforcement of noncompete agreements is different than at the headquarters. This is unlikely to be an issue in my study, as at worst it would bias the results toward the null. In addition, the type of information that would be disclosed by the firm to the capital markets arguably is more likely to be available at the headquarters than at other locations. In general, the use of the headquarters to proxy for the location of the firm has been extensive in the literature (e.g. Hilary and Hui 2009; Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005; Agrawal and Matsa 2013).

  12. Two employees of rival firms sitting close to each other in a plane could also transmit information. Investment bankers are explicitly told not to discuss client pitches in planes, lest rival teams overhear the conversation and target the prospective client.

  13. The competition variable is assessed using the primary historical NAICS code of the firm taken from Compustat. The NAICS has several advantages over other classifications. First, it is more up to date than the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. Second, it is more granular than the others, which allows for determining more directly the true product-market rivals. I use in my analyses only companies that have an NAICS code properly defined at the six-digit level.

  14. The sample covers the fiscal years from 1998 to 2013 when using the I/B/E/S management forecast database, from 2002 to 2013 when using the measures built from Capital IQ, and from 1985 to 2011 when using the disclosure quality measures from Chen et al. (2015).

  15. Firms are mandated to file a form 8-K to the SEC shortly after the occurrence of specific events, such as a restatement or a change in auditors. Detailed SEC requirements are available at https://www.sec.gov/files/form8-k.pdf. I consider a disclosure to be mandatory if it is included in the requirements that trigger the filing of a form 8-K.

  16. At minimum Capital IQ should record four mandatory disclosures during the year corresponding to the release of the firm’s financial statements. Using a threshold of ten ensures that Capital IQ properly monitors the firm during the year. See subsection 5.6 for analyses based on different thresholds.

  17. Because Thomson Financial discontinued First Call in 2012, I was unable to obtain management forecast data from this database. Thomson replaced First Call with a separate management forecast feed from I/B/E/S. However, the data are widely populated only from 1998 and may suffer from the same issues described in Chuk et al. (2012).

  18. Because Ali et al. (2015) find an association between enforcement of noncompete agreements and the asymmetric disclosure of bad news versus good news, a concern in the analyses using MgmtForecast as the dependent variable is that the results could be driven by a lessened disclosure of bad news. I use GoodMgmtForecast, which is related only to disclosure of good news, to address this concern.

  19. In all the analyses, continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers in the specifications.

  20. Industries with SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 7370–7374, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 8731–8734 are classified as high litigation risk.

  21. Several NAICS industries span more than one two-digit NAICS code. For example manufacturing corresponds to NAICS codes 31, 32, and 33. I consolidate these into one fixed effect.

  22. I use County Business Patterns data available from 1998 to 2011 in these tests. The sample size is reduced accordingly.

  23. The data are available at http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer.html. See Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005, p. 271) for the distance formula. Because the zip code is not available for all firms in Compustat, this slightly reduces the sample.

  24. Ertimur et al. (2017) identify additional changes outside of the 1991–2004 period covered by Garmaise. However, these changes did not modify the noncompete agreement enforcement score by more than one, and they appear incremental. Thus, I mainly focus on the three changes discussed by Garmaise.

  25. I primarily use OLS instead of logit because of the incorporation of a large number of fixed effects in the specifications. See Albert and Anderson (1984) for more details about issues of quasi-separation of the data when using logistic specifications.

References

  • Acharya, V. V., Baghai, R. P., & Subramanian, K. V. (2014). Wrongful discharge laws and innovation. Review of Financial Studies, 27(1), 301–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agrawal, A. K., & Matsa, D. A. (2013). Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 449–470.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agrawal, A., Cockburn, I., & McHale, J. (2006). Gone but not forgotten: Knowledge flows, labor mobility, and enduring social relationships. Journal of Economic Geography, 6, 571–591.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Albert, A., & Anderson, J. A. (1984). On the existence of maximum likelihood estimates in logistic regression models. Biometrika, 71(1), 1–10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ali, A., Klasa, S., & Yeung, E. (2009). The limitations of industry concentration measures constructed with Compustat data: Implication for finance research. Review of Financial Studies, 22(10), 3839–3871.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ali, A., Klasa, S., & Yeung, E. (2014). Industry concentration and corporate disclosure policy. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 58(2–3), 240–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ali, A., Li, N., & Zhang, W. (2015). Manager’s career concerns and asymmetric disclosure of bad versus good news. Working paper.

  • Almeida, P., & Kogut, B. (1999). The localization of knowledge and the mobility of engineers in regional networks. Management Science, 45, 905–917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aobdia, D. (2015). Proprietary information spillovers and supplier choice: Evidence from auditors. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(4), 1504–1539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Badertscher, B., Shroff, D., & White, H. D. (2013). Externalities of public firm presence: Evidence from private firms’ investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 109(3), 682–706.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baginski, S. P., Hassell, J. M., & Kimbrough, M. D. (2002). The effect of legal environment on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts issued in U.S. and Canadian markets. Accounting Review, 77(1), 25–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bamber, L. S., & Cheon, Y. S. (1998). Discretionary management earnings forecast disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and forecast specificity choices. Journal of Accounting Research, 36, 167–190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Belenzon, S., & Schankerman, M. (2013). Spreading the word: Geography, policy, and knowledge spillovers. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3), 884–903.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bensinger, G. (2016). Amazon sues new target executive. Wall Street Journal, March 23, B1.

  • Berger, P. G. (2011). Challenges and opportunities in disclosure research: A discussion of ‘the financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51, 204–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003). Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. Journal of Political Economy, 111(5), 1043–1075.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010). The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 296–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bishara, N. D., Martin, K. J., & Thomas, R. S. (2013). When do CEOs have covenants not to compete in their employment contracts? Working paper.

  • Boeker, W. (1997). Executive migration and strategic change: The effect of top manager movement on product-market entry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2), 213–236.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boschma, R., Eriksson, R., & Lindgren, U. (2009). How does labor mobility affect the performance of plants? The importance of relatedness and geographical proximity. Journal of Economic Geography, 9(2), 169–190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Breschi, S., & Lissoni, F. (2009). Mobility of skilled workers and co-invention networks: An anatomy of localized knowledge flows. Journal of Economic Geography, 9, 439–468.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, S., Miao, B., & Shevlin, T. (2015). A new measure of disclosure quality: The level of disaggregation of accounting data in annual reports. Journal of Accounting Research, 53(5), 1017–1054.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chuk, E., Matsumoto, D., & Miller, G. S. (2012). Assessing methods of identifying management forecasts: CIG vs. researcher collected. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55, 23–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clinch, G., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1997). Competitive disadvantage and discretionary disclosure in industries. Australian Journal of Management, 22(2), 125–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corredoira, R. A., & Rosenkopf, L. (2010). Should auld acquaintance be forgot? The reverse transfer of knowledge through mobility ties. Strategic Management Journal, 31, 159–181.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darrough, M. N., & Stoughton, N. M. (1990). Financial disclosure policy in an entry game. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, 219–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dedman, E., & Lennox, C. (2009). Perceived competition, profitability, and the withholding of information about sales and the cost of sales. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48, 210–230.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeFond, M. L., & Lennox, C. S. (2017). Do PCAOB inspections improve the quality of internal control audits? Journal of Accounting Research, 55(3), 591–627.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dye, R. A. (2001). An evaluation of “essays on disclosure” and the disclosure literature in accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 181–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Einhorn, E. (2007). Voluntary disclosure under uncertainty about the reporting objective. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(2–3), 245–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Einhorn, E., & Ziv, A. (2008). Intertemporal dynamics of corporate voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 567–589.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Erkens, D. H. (2011). Do firms use time-vested stock-based pay to keep research and development investments secret? Journal of Accounting Research, 49(4), 861–894.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ertimur, Y., Rawson C., Rogers J. L., & Zechman S. L. C. (2017). Bridging the gap: Evidence from externally hired CEOs. Working paper.

  • Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(2), 137–164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankel, R., Johnson, M., & Skinner, D. J. (1999). An empirical examination of conference calls as voluntary disclosure medium. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 133–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gardner, T. M. (2005). Interfirm competition for human resources: Evidence from the software industry. Academy of Management Journal, 48(2), 237–256.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garmaise, M. J. (2011). Ties that truly bind: Noncompetition agreements, executive compensation, and firm investment. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 27(2), 376–425.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilson, R. J. (1999). The legal infrastructure of high technology industrial districts: Silicon Valley, route 128, and covenants not to compete. New York University Law Review, 74, 575–629.

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40(1–3), 3–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, S. (1981). The role of warranties and private disclosure about product quality. Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 461–483.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, M. H. (1998). The association between competition and manager’s business segment reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting Research, 36, 111–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heider, F., & Ljungqvist, A. (2012). As certain as debt and taxes: Estimating the tax sensitivity of leverage from exogenous state tax changes. National Bureau of Economic Research working paper. http://www.nber.org/papers/w18263.

  • Hilary, G., & Hui, K. W. (2009). Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? Journal of Financial Economics, 93, 455–473.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hyde, A. (2011). Should noncompetes be enforced? Regulation, 33(4), 6–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ivkovic, Z., & Weisbenner, S. (2005). Local does as local is: Information content of the geography of individual investors’ common stock investments. Journal of Finance, 60(1), 267–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jaffe, A. B., Trajtenberg, M., & Henderson, R. (1993). Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 577–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, M. A. (1999). Application group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 1999. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 14, 283–302.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, S. N., & Stromberg, P. (2003). Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 281–315.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Karuna, C. (2007). Industry product-market competition and managerial incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(2–3), 275–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 31(2), 246–271.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (1996). Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. Accounting Review, 71(4), 467–492.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (2000). Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: Reducing information asymmetry or hyping the stock? Contemporary Accounting Research, 17(4), 623–662.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • LaVan, H. (2000). A logit model to predict the enforceability of noncompete agreements. Employee Responsibilities Rights Journal, 12(4), 219–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leonard, B. (2001). Recruiting from the competition. HR Magazine, 46(2), 78–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Li, X. (2010). The impact of product-market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures. Review of Accounting Studies, 15, 663–771.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, F., Lundholm, R. J., & Minnis, M. (2013). A new measure of competition based on 10-K filings: Derivations and implications for financial statement analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(2), 399–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, Y., Lin Y., & Zhang L. (2017). Trade secret laws and corporate disclosure: Causal evidence on the proprietary cost. Working paper.

  • Malsberger, B. (2004). Covenants not to compete: A state-by-state survey. Washington, DC: BNA Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marx, M. (2011). The firm strikes back: Noncompete agreements and the mobility of technical professionals. American Sociological Review, 76(5), 695–712.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marx, M., & Singh, J. (2013). Geographic constraints on knowledge spillovers: Political borders vs. spatial proximity. Management Science, 59(9), 2056–2078.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marx, M., Strumsky, D., & Fleming, L. (2009). Mobility, skills, and the Michigan noncompete experiment. Management Science, 55(6), 875–889.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380–391.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, G. (2002). Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 173–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2001). The firm as a dedicated hierarchy: A theory of the origins and growth of firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 805–851.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rao, H., & Drazin, R. (2002). Overcoming resources constraints on product innovation by recruiting talent from rivals: A study of the mutual fund industry, 1986–1994. Academy of Management Journal, 45(3), 491–507.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samila, S., & Sorenson, O. (2011). Noncompete covenants: Incentives to innovate or impediments to growth. Management Science, 57(3), 425–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional advantage: Culture and competition in Silicon Valley and route 128. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shroff, N., Xun, A. X., White, H. D., & Zhang, W. (2013). Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 securities offering reform. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(5), 1299–1345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shroff, N., Verdi, R. S., & Yost B. Y. (2017). When does the peer information environment matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics, Forthcoming.

  • Simon, R., & A. Loten. (2013). Litigation over noncompete clauses is rising. Wall Street Journal August 14.

  • Song, J., Almeida, P., & Wu, G. (2003). Learning by hiring: When is mobility likely to facilitate interfirm knowledge transfer? Management Science, 49(4), 351–365.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Starr, E., Bishara N., & Prescott J.J. 2017. Noncompetes in the U.S. labor force. Working paper.

  • Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk costs and market structure: Price competition, advertising, and the evolution of concentration. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 179–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verrecchia, R. E. (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 97–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verrecchia, R. E., & Weber, J. (2006). Redacted disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(4), 791–814.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wagenhofer, A. (1990). Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, 341–363.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman, A. (2011). Mud flies in new Bratz brawl. Wall Street Journal January 12.

  • Zucker, L. G., Darby, M. R., & Armstrong, J. (1998). Geographically localized knowledge spillovers or markets? Economic Inquiry, 36, 65–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

A prior version of this paper was circulated under the title “Noncompete Agreements, Product-Market Competition, and Company Disclosure.” I thank Shuping Chen, Bin Miao, and Terry Shevlin for sharing their disclosure quality measure with me. I also thank Peter Easton (editor), two anonymous referees, David Aboody, Judson Caskey, Daniel Cohen [the 2014 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Midyear Meeting conference discussant], Craig Chapman, David Erkens, Jack Hughes, Robert Magee, Tatiana Sandino, Beverly Walther, and the seminar participants at the 2014 FARS Conference, Harvard Business School, Northwestern University, and the University of Southern California for helpful comments on prior versions of this paper. I also thank Tony Liu for excellent research assistance. Last, I gratefully acknowledge funding from the Accounting Research Center at Northwestern University and, in particular, the Revsine and Ernst & Young LIVE Fellowships. I was a Senior Economic Research Fellow at the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) between September 2014 and September 2016. I wrote this paper before joining the PCAOB. The PCAOB, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its Economic Research Fellows and employees. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board, individual Board members, or staff of the PCAOB.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

    Daniel Aobdia

Authors
  1. Daniel Aobdia
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel Aobdia.

Electronic supplementary material

ESM 1

(PDF 758 kb)

Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 8 Noncompete agreement enforcement level
Full size table
Table 9 Variable definitions
Full size table

Appendix 2: Examples of capital IQ disclosures

1.1 E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (1/10/2008): Client announcement

EI DuPont de Nemours & Co. announced that one of its healthcare products, DuPont(™) Corian® solid surface, has been selected by the Washington Hospital Center for its emergency department. The product recently was incorporated into a children’s ward at the Roswell Park Cancer Institute in Buffalo, N.Y. Washington Hospital Center is using the technology as part of its vision to build ER One, which will be an all-risks-ready emergency care facility, created to provide emergency medical care during acts of terrorism and emerging illness and built to function fully as a hospital emergency department during daily operations. The current phase of the project, entitled Bridge to ER One, will test these new innovations and technologies.

1.2 Bombardier Inc. (9/22/2009): Product announcement

Bombardier Inc. plans to build a new version called the C Series, which will have up to 135 seats to rival Boeing’s popular 737 … and the Airbus A318. Bombardier plans to spend about $2 billion to develop its first aircraft with more than 100 seats. Bombardier’s new plane, called the C Series, would have three versions with 110 seats to 135 seats. It would be Bombardier’s biggest aircraft, beyond the company’s 86-seat CRJ900.

1.3 Callaway Gold (1/9/2004): Product announcement

Callaway Golf Co. announced the introduction of the new Callaway Golf(R) Forged + Wedges, the latest masterpieces from the Company’s Chief Golf Club Designer, Roger Cleveland. The new Callaway Golf Forged + Wedges have been created using Roger Cleveland’s decades of short game expertise, Callaway Golf’s world-class production resources and extensive feedback from tour professionals. The new wedges offer golfers many exciting options, including a larger head size, a new tour-inspired sole grind and multiple bounce angles for added personalization. Callaway Golf Forged + Wedges are expected to ship to retail accounts this month.

1.4 Cisco Systems Inc. (9/23/2004): Other key development

Cisco Systems Inc. announced the company’s intent to open a research and development center in Shanghai, China. The new facility will represent an initial $32 million investment over the next five years, and Cisco expects to hire approximately 100 employees over the next 18 months to focus on research and development.

1.5 Mayor’s Jewelers (1/9/2004): Other key development

Mayor’s Jewelers Inc. enjoyed strong gross sales and comparable store sales increases in the November–December holiday season (November 2 through December 27, 2003) as compared to last year’s comparable period, announced Tom Andruskevich, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer. Comparable store sales during the holiday season increased 15% over the prior year period. Gross sales for the holiday season increased 14% to $40.8 million, with Mayors operating 28 stores, from $35.7 million when Mayors operated an average of 30 stores in the comparable period last year.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Aobdia, D. Employee mobility, noncompete agreements, product-market competition, and company disclosure. Rev Account Stud 23, 296–346 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-017-9425-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-017-9425-z

Keywords

JEL classification

Search

Navigation