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The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 281–293 | Cite as

How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)

  • Andrew T. YoungEmail author
Article

Abstract

Will a society’s political agents provide good governance? An answer must be sought first and foremost at the constitutional level. While Austrians have made important contributions to constitutional political economy (CPE), they have often avoided interesting and important questions regarding today’s constitutional realities. This is particularly true when it comes to de jure constitutional design. Why do de jure constitutions matter? Can they be designed such that they are robust? When they are not robust, does constitutional drift lead to a better or worse governance environment? In discussing these questions, I attempt to point Austrian scholars towards some potentially fruitful CPE research avenues.

Keywords

Constitutional political economy Constitutional drift Austrian economics Political catallaxy Robust political economy 

JEL codes

B53 H10 P00 P16 P48 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rawls College of BusinessTexas Tech UniversityLubbockUSA

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