In this issue, Elert and Henrekson observe that Austrian economic theory is lacking with respect to explaining formal governance in the economy, and suggest drawing from, if not incorporating, re-cent work on the collaborative innovation bloc. This, they argue, would make Austrian economics more relevant to policy. I elaborate on and specify the theory space they address, and agree that it is a nascent and still underdeveloped area of theorizing in Austrian theory. However, recognizing the complexity of coordination and how it is prevalent on all institutional levels of economic analysis, I question the wisdom of adopting a single case over producing a universal Austrian theory of organizing and governance.
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Bylund, P.L. Where is the Austrian theory of collaborative orders? Comment on Elert and Henrekson. Rev Austrian Econ 32, 339–347 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-019-00457-w
- Austrian economics
- Collaborative innovation blocs