The super-alertness of central banks

  • Nicolás CachanoskyEmail author
  • Alexander W. Salter


This paper applies Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurial alertness to central banking. As opposed to entrepreneurs operating within the market, central banks can operate outside the market by defining its structure and regulations. We label as “super-alertness” the particular type of Kirznerian alertness that central banks are required to have to successfully achieve stable monetary equilibrium.


Free banking Central banking Alertness Super-alertness Monetary equilibrium 

JEL classification

B53 D80 E50 



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Copyright information

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMetropolitan State University of DenverDenverUSA
  2. 2.Free Market InstituteTexas Tech UniversityLubbockUSA

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